Hard-line cleric Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential election on Saturday in a move that is expected to bolster the conservative legacy of the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The decision is not expected to derail ongoing negotiations aimed at restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, even though Mr. Raisi himself is under US sanctions over accusations of human rights abuses.  Many voters stayed away from the polls as the outcome had been predicted for months with many progressive candidates barred from running.

The Islamic Republic has entered a post-revolutionary dynamic in which a fading revolutionary generation seeks to ensure that the rising political leadership sustains their revolutionary ideals,” says Norman T. Roule, former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI and Cipher Brief Expert. “The regime’s decision to bar so many candidates and the low turnout make this election a historic embarrassment for the regime and its supporters.”

The Cipher Brief talked with Roule about what the election means and what it doesn’t mean when it comes to relations with the west, the progressive movement within Iran and the election’s impact on the oil markets.


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As part of a special series on climate in partnership with The Intelligence Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Cipher Brief Expert and Senior Editor Kristin Wood, The Cipher Brief is focusing on the national security implications of climate change. 

This report is derived from a half-day conference in April 2021 co-sponsored by the Intelligence Project and the Environment and Natural Resources Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, along with the Center for Climate and Security and The Cipher Brief. It explores the requirements of the U.S. IC to fulfill the mission prescribed by President Biden, DNI Haines, and Secretary Kerry. The IC must rise to challenge, unshackled from the past, to re-imagine its role in combatting climate change.

The Authors

Calder Walton, Asst. Director, Belfer Center’s Applied History Project and Intelligence Project, Harvard University

Calder Walton is Assistant Director of the Belfer Center’s Applied History Project and Intelligence Project. Calder’s research is broadly concerned with intelligence history, grand strategy, and international relations. The

Sean Power, Masters in Public Policy Candidate, Harvard Kennedy School

Sean Power is a Masters in Public Policy 2021 candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. Prior to HKS, he managed the analyst program at Kobre & Kim LLP, where he assisted on matters involving government enforcement defense and internal investigations.

The Report

The U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Avril Haines, has stated that climate change needs to be at the center of U.S. foreign policy and national security. It is a threat multiplier that impacts every function of government and society: territorial integrity, economic well-being, social stability, and military capabilities are all impacted by climate change, directly and indirectly. However, in addressing climate change, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is currently unsure of its mission space and hitherto has been relying on boilerplate responses to it. In an exclusive discussion, the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, Secretary John Kerry, who should be a principal consumer of intelligence about climate change within the U.S. government, stated that the U.S. IC must deliver significantly more.

The increasing effects of climate change are arising at a moment when the nature of intelligence itself is undergoing a revolution—from the collection of hidden secrets to collation of non-obvious (but knowable) data frequently hiding out in the open. This watershed in intelligence and national security requires bold, innovative, ideas for the U.S. IC to adapt and anticipate security threats derived by climate change. It must establish its mission space and alter its own architecture to ensure it is providing its customers with intelligence about them needed. Its mission will not be about spies disseminating secrets to policymakers; rather, it will require a new intelligence and national security paradigm that must reach across society, allowing the general public to consume climate intelligence and hold policymakers to account.

Background

The twenty-first century presents globalized threats that will require globalized solutions, the greatest of which is climate change. As the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated, no country is immune from actor-less threats like novel disease outbreaks and climate change. When combined with other security threats like transnational terrorism and ubiquitous cyberattacks, it becomes clear that existing national security frameworks are insufficient. New relationships and lines of communication will need to be forged, both within the U.S. government, in the private sector, and internationally with allies and adversaries. The U.S. IC needs to determine the requirements of its customers regarding climate change and how its unique collection and analytical capabilities fit into this new mission space.

The IC has incorporated climate change into its analysis and threat assessments for decades, but climate has not received the attention it requires given the magnitude of the threat it poses. On January 27, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order on tackling the climate crisis at home and abroad, establishing that “climate considerations shall be an essential element of United States foreign policy and national security.” The order also called for the Director of National Intelligence to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on the national and economic security impacts of climate change within 120 days.

The Climate Change, Intelligence, and Global Security conference at Harvard’s Belfer Center earlier this year, brought together senior climate experts, current and former intelligence officers, and leaders in the private sector and academia to discuss the climate threat and generate innovative ideas on role the IC will play in combatting that threat. Led by Paul Kolbe, Director of the Intelligence Project, Kristin Wood, Intelligence Project Non-Resident Fellow, and Erin Sikorsky, Deputy Director of the Center for Climate and Security, the conference facilitated an urgent opportunity for productive dialogue on the climate threat.

Climate change as a threat to international security

Policymakers and the public need to understand that climate change impacts seemingly unrelated challenges and magnifies existing threats. The direct effects of climate change are readily apparent around the world—melting glaciers, rising sea levels, thawing permafrost, longer droughts, hotter heat waves, persistent wildfires, torrential rains, and catastrophic storm systems. These effects create disastrous consequences for humans like crop failures, fishery collapses, water insecurity, and the inundation of coastal regions, all of which lead to mass migration and displacement. These situations lead to fragile states and regions where increased conflict over scarce resources allows malign actors thrive. In this way, climate change is a threat multiplier that touches every aspect of international security.

Professor John P. Holdren, the Teresa and John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, noted that the big picture on how climate change will impact the planet is clear, but the detailed effects are difficult to predict with precision and confidence, in part because we do not know exactly how human societies will react. This uncertainty exacerbates the security threat posed by climate change. We know it will increase the number of displaced persons in the world, but we do not know when they will be displaced, how many there will be, or where they will go.

Climate change also impacts the effective functioning of the U.S. military: to meet traditional security threats and protect Americans at home and abroad. U.S. bases around the world function as launching pads for everything from quick tactical operations to large-scale disaster relief missions. When severe weather damages those bases or limits their ability to operate at full capacity, America’s security is put at risk. Disasters like the flooding at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, headquarters for U.S. Strategic Command, and Hurricane Michael’s destruction of Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida show that this threat knows no geographic bounds. Their effects are costly as well—the Air Force requested nearly $5 billion to rebuild those two bases alone.

The overall impacts of climate change on international security are inevitable, consequential, and predictable. Previously the U.S. government has undertaken more extensive, and expensive, actions on the basis of proportionally less intelligence about security threats. The U.S. IC must give climate change the proportional attention it deserves.

Role of U.S. intelligence in addressing climate change

Climate change poses an existential, global, non-state security threat, making it fundamentally different from past threats. Its unprecedented nature will require unprecedented thinking by the U.S. IC and requirements from it. Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon stated clearly that it is not enough to just say that the U.S. IC should focus more on climate— rather, the challenge lies in determining what its specific contribution will be, and then evaluating what changes need to occur to make that contribution happen. Answering these questions will require difficult, but necessary, upfront work. Without that work, the U.S. IC is likely to lead with its current capabilities, rather than identifying and developing capabilities needed to meet the nature of the new threat we face.

The U.S. IC must play to its strengths in carving out its climate mission. Intelligence is no longer just about stealing secrets; it is about providing policymakers with decision advantages to influence events, which is the same as the past, but with a key difference that doing so now requires mastery of is a vast eco-space of openly-available information. To accomplish its mission, the U.S. IC must leverage its analytic tradecraft to present objective assessments about climate change to policymakers. This means collecting intelligence, assessing it, removing bias, and delivering timely and relevant assessments to customers. The U.S. IC must also leverage its global relationships with partners and competitors in performing these tasks. These relationships lie below politics and can help elicit understanding that allows policymakers to distinguish facts on the ground from prevailing political rhetoric of the day.

The U.S. IC’s workforce and technology will need to advance and adapt to serve the climate mission. It does not need to have the foremost climate experts, but it does need to have dialogue with them, and develop its own climate expertise. Like other threats, the IC needs personnel that are devoted to understanding this new threat and understand its place in larger risk frameworks. Predictive models are critical to understanding climate science, and the IC should invest more resources into artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities (AI/ML) that can inform them. Intelligence professionals will not need to advance science, and scientists will not need to assess national security; but collaborations between the IC and the federal science community are necessary and will benefit both by allowing them to identify and meet shared objectives.

Climate change intelligence cannot be siloed. As DNI Haines promised, it must be integrated into traditional security threat assessments, and those emerging threats from other globalized challenges, bio-hazards, cyber capabilities, and weaponized information, if we want to understand how they interact and manifest around the globe. Compared to the twentieth century, when intelligence was dominated by governments, the twenty-first century offers more democratic forms of intelligence: the private sector offers major capabilities to collect and analyze intelligence. It has disrupted and transformed the nature of intelligence. The IC’s advantage in this new environment will come from thinking deeply about these issues and using its unique analytical and collection capabilities to identify patterns and trends others might overlook.

The future of intelligence cooperation and climate change

Climate change is an indiscriminating challenge unlike anything humanity has encountered before. Understanding how it is different helps illustrate the need for intelligence cooperation among states, large and small, to combat it. Carol Dumaine, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, noted that the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted many of the ways in which the climate threat is unique. It is non-state, non-adversarial, non-linear, boundary-less, and its root causes can be found in human economic activity. Unlike pandemics, however, combatting climate change will require something we have never done: decades of consistent cooperation across states with an eye towards tackling a systemic problem that will persist for centuries.

The U.S. IC needs to determine how it will work with other countries to combat the shared threat of climate change. The big first step is determining what the security collective is trying to accomplish. One area ripe for collaboration is foresight and early warning systems. During the Cold War the famous “red telephone” connected the White House and the Kremlin, enabling direct communication to avoid nuclear brinksmanship. Similar innovate thinking will be needed on climate change cooperation. Lt. Gen. Richard Nugee, Climate Change and Sustainability Strategy Lead for the UK Ministry of Defence, emphasized that the biggest danger on climate change is not a morass of bureaucracy, but instead a lack of imagination in understanding its impact and generating solutions for it.

Relying on existing partnerships, such as the Five Eyes alliance or NATO, will not be sufficient. Those agreements will play a role, but they do not include some of largest contributors to greenhouse gases or the countries that will suffer the largest initial impacts from climate change. Intelligence communities are by nature competitive and adversarial, but when it comes to climate change they will need to be cooperative. The U.S. IC needs to identify areas of cooperation even with adversaries like China and Russia. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow and former Director of the Intelligence Project, tasked the U.S. IC to look for a peace dividend—areas where collaboration on climate will yield multilateral benefits. Even though spying will still exist, as it always had, we cannot let espionage stand in the way of climate collaboration.

Any collaboration on climate intelligence will certainly require American leadership. That means America needs to treat the climate threat with the seriousness it deserves. Climate change is siloed into a one-page length analysis in the 27-page Annual Threat Assessment issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in April 2021. The six pages focusing on China and Russia make no mention of how those are contributing to climate change or working to combat it. The IC must continually reinforce that climate is a serious and central threat. We cannot wait until the impacts are painfully obvious for every individual across the globe to treat it with the seriousness it requires.

The private sector, intelligence, and climate change

The threat from climate change reinforces the fact that intelligence is no longer a domain solely for governments. Mekala Krishnan, Partner at the McKinsey Global Institute, underscored that the private sector is also seeking to take climate risk out of a sustainability silo and integrate it into all aspects of decision making affected by risk and finance. Companies are thinking about how climate interacts with physical capital, natural resources, labor supply, and food supply—the factors of production in an economy that fundamentally affect our lives and livelihoods. One of the most important factors in a country’s national security is the health of its economy. The U.S. IC needs to be working with the private sector to understand what the economic effects of climate change will be.

In many respects, the U.S. government is still one of the few parties that can afford the costs to collect data on climate change, much like space exploration and early Internet research. The private sector can innovate ways to extract insights from that public data. Harnessing that with government capabilities will require innovative public-private partnerships with a shared strategy to help combat climate change. The U.S. IC must develop a level of transparency on climate data that will allow the private sector to identify where incentives for research and development exist. It will not matter how good the climate intelligence collected by the U.S. IC is if it does not get into the hands of public and private users in the right shape and form.

At the same time, the IC cannot be everywhere at once, collecting troves of climate data at significant cost. Richard Jenkins, CEO of Saildrone, noted that the private sector has the capability to deploy significant private money to develop and test new technologies that advance climate data collection, which the government can purchase at great value and incorporate into climate intelligence analysis. New technology is democratizing intelligence; it will force the U.S. IC to change how it interacts with the private sector— for the better.

Conclusion

In a moderated discussion with Dr. Calder Walton, Secretary Kerry stated unambiguously that the U.S. IC needs to start providing policymakers with a decision advantage on climate change in order for the U.S. government to lead the world on meeting this unprecedented threat. That starts with treating climate change seriously. The U.S. IC will need to determine its requirements, play to its strengths, and adapt its workforce to best serve its mission. It will need to cultivate deeper cooperation with allies and adversaries, develop new relationships with the private sector, and approach climate change with a fresh mindset to seek and find what others overlook.

When it comes to climate change, the U.S. IC should also reframe who its customers are, not just policymakers, to whom it gives secret briefings, but also the public. By publicly disseminating assessments, the U.S. IC can effectively democratize intelligence about climate change, with the public holding policymakers to account for their actions or inactions on the basis of shared intelligence.

The Cipher Brief is proud to be continuing our coverage on Climate with a series of webcast briefings beginning in July 2021.

Read also:

The Climate and US National Security Conversation with Admiral Jim Stavridis (Ret.)

How to Integrate Climate in Future National Security Risk

Russia’s Climate Problem and Opportunity

Why the Intelligence Community Needs a Climate Change Task Force

 

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EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — On 16 June, US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin met for just under four hours in Geneva. This was Mr. Biden’s first meeting with Mr. Putin during his presidency and Biden is the fifth US President with whom Putin has held a summit.

Expectations for the summit were characterized as low by both sides in advance and assessed a bit more positively after the conclusion of the meeting. The meeting presented an opportunity for both leaders to present grievances and warnings to the other (and show toughness to their domestic constituencies).  Other than presenting the opportunity to blow off steam, the results of the meeting appear modest:  the agreement to return ambassadors to their posts, to resume bilateral arms control discussions, to conduct discussions on “strategic stability” and to hold unspecified consultations on cyber. In typical fashion, Mr. Putin rejected all of Mr. Biden’s assertions about Russian actions and made counter accusations referencing hostile US actions.

Of the deliverables from the summit, cyber will no doubt turn out to be the most problematic area for follow up. Mr. Biden apparently delivered to Mr. Putin a list of 16 US critical infrastructure sectors that should be considered “off limits” for cyberattacks, e.g., “red lines” not to be crossed without the risk of significant retaliation. For his part, Mr. Putin asserted that it is Russia that is the victim of cyberattacks originating from the territory of the US and it’s NATO partners and also is the victim of  attempts to interfere with Russian elections.  The challenge in cyber discussions going forward will center around three areas:  differing interpretations of the relevance of deterrence theory in today’s cyber environment, attribution, and control.

Mr. Biden’s firm comments to Mr. Putin on recent cyberattacks against the US such as the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipelines (Mr. Biden is said to have asked Mr. Putin how he would react if Russia’s pipelines were hit?) and his provision of a list of “off limits” US infrastructure entities suggests a deep belief in this administration that Russia can be deterred from engaging in future conduct of cyber operations against US targets or “sanctioning” attacks originating from the territory of the Russian Federation by criminal groups.

Unfortunately, it is highly likely that either Mr. Putin nor those who control the levers of Russian cyber operations agree that deterrence theory applies.  Deterrence only works when both sides know the other is capable of – and willing to – cause significant harm to the other.

The Russian side likely believes (and may have amply demonstrated) that the US is disproportionately vulnerable to cyber risk at every level of its economic, societal, and political infrastructure whereas Russia is not.  There is a reason the use of cyber tools has become a central feature of Russian strategic doctrine. They work and seem a legitimate tool that falls short of conventional war. Hybrid warfare using cyber tools, the Russian side would argue, is no different than the economic warfare Russia is experiencing from sanctions imposed by the US its allies.

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Behind the Headlines brings you expert perspectives on today’s headlines by telling you more than what happened, but also what it means.  You can also listen to The Cipher Brief’s Daily Open-Source Collection Podcast wherever you listen to podcasts.

Jack Devine, Former Acting Director, National Clandestine Service, CIA

Cipher Brief Expert Jack Devine, a 32-year CIA veteran. Devine served as both Acting Director and Associate Director of CIA’s operations from 1993-1995.  He is a founding partner and President of The Arkin Group, which specializes in international crisis management, strategic intelligence and investigative research. Devine is the author of Spymaster’s Prism: The Fight Against Russian Aggression.

Russia’s multi-pronged support of Myanmar is a microcosm of its strategy in Southeast Asia.

In the months since Myanmar’s February military coup, Russia and China have been the junta’s most powerful allies, but Russia has exploited regional instability to position itself as a third path between China and the West. While China was closer with the former Myanmar government than the military, it was also concerned about the government’s ties with the West and potential interference in its development efforts, particularly its Belt and Road Initiative. Russia, on the other hand, doesn’t depend on stability in Southeast Asia to the same degree as China and can instead take advantage of warring factions. Last month, on his first trip outside of the immediate region since February, Myanmar’s junta leader Min Aung Hlaing went to Moscow to meet with high-level Russian defense officials instead of heading to Beijing. Hlaing has reportedly visited Russia seven times within the past decade and previously stated that over 6,000 Myanmar officers have studied at Russian military academies. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia was responsible for almost 40% of arms sales to Myanmar from 1999-2018, second only to China. SIPRI data further indicates that Russia has been Southeast Asia’s largest arms supplier over the past two decades, counting Vietnam and Laos as top customers. But Russia is offering the region more than arms and has promised Myanmar two million Covid-19 vaccines and assistance in the nation’s own vaccine production efforts. Russia has also been trying to expand free trade agreements between its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Southeast Asian countries, most recently getting Indonesia to sign on to the deal. Stepping even further into soft power efforts, last week Russia’s foreign minister met with his Bangladeshi counterpart and agreed to encourage Myanmar to engage in dialogue with Bangladesh on the Rohingya crisis.


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Leftist, former schoolteacher Pedro Castillo is declared President of a divided Peru, projected economic growth could play in his favor. 

Peru, like many of its neighbors, has been battling the triple and interwoven threat of Covid-19, social unrest, and severe economic downturn. But for the past several years Peru has also been challenged by sharp divisions between its executive and legislative powers. Last November, Peru’s unicameral legislature voted to impeach then-President Martín Vizcarra, citing mismanagement of the pandemic and corruption, in a move that outraged thousands. The June presidential elections were likewise fraught. Castillo’s right-wing rival Keiko Fujimori, who is also under investigation for corruption, alleged electoral fraud and the Peruvians initiated a six-week long investigation, eventually finding Castillo the rightful victor. The EU, U.S. and 14 electoral missions deemed the elections legitimate, and the U.S. called the election a “model of democracy” for the region. Castillo, who previously worked as an elementary school teacher and has never held public office, will be greeted by a political establishment that is almost entirely against him. Peruvian citizens are also deeply divided, and many urban elites reportedly moved their money overseas out of fear for Castillo’s economic policies. But Castillo’s Peru Libre party holds fewer than 40 of 130 seats in the legislature and Castillo has already recruited several moderate advisors. Further, he has backed away from talk of nationalizing Peru’s lucrative multinational mining, oil, gas, and hydrocarbon companies, instead pledging to raise taxes on mining firms. Prices of copper and gold, two of Peru’s most critical exports, remain high and Covid-related trade obstacles are expected to ease over the coming months. While it is uncertain how effective Castillo will be, or where he will ultimately fall on his policies, positive projections for Peru’s export-based economy will likely play in his favor.


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Enjin becomes first blockchain platform to gain acceptance into the United Nations Global Compact, signaling widespread range of corporate sustainability efforts.

On Tuesday, Enjin, an innovative blockchain technology company focused on non-fungible tokens (NFTs), became the first such company to join the United Nations Global Compact. Upon admission, Enjin stated that it hopes to use NFTs to promote sustainability and equality in line with the UN pact that encourages businesses and firms worldwide to adopt more environmentally friendly and socially responsible practices. NFTs have surged in popularity in the past two years, and during the first quarter of 2021 NFT sales reportedly exceeded US $2 billion. In essence, an NFT is a way to prove ownership of a unique virtual item. It’s a unit of data that’s stored on a blockchain, or digital ledger, that certifies exclusive ownership of digital files ranging from photos to sports trading cards. Enjin, which is headquartered in Singapore, has focused its NFT efforts on games and apps and is reportedly able to operate with a lower carbon footprint than Bitcoin due to a slimmed-down verification model that requires less energy. This week, the UN Global Compact not only included Enjin as a member, but gave the company its highest membership rank, sending a signal that it’s interested in promoting such an environmental effort by crypto and blockchain entrepreneurs. For its part, Enjin has stated that it wants to employ the technology in carbon capture companies, fighting climate change in the process. The Head of the UN AI and Robotics Center remarked that during the global struggle to recover from the pandemic we should take advantage of new technologies like AI and blockchain to better equip ourselves for the future.

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We’re starting a new segment on The Cipher Brief’s Open-Source Collection Podcast and adding to the line-up of curated headlines we bring you from around the world with expert insights on today’s news. 

The Cipher Brief’s Brad Christian talked with former CIA Officer Marc Polymeropoulos this week about what’s next for the US Government when it comes to investigating ‘Havana Syndrome’, making sure Afghan interpreters aren’t left behind and why a White House visit by Jordan’s King Abdullah was a bigger deal than some may realize.  

Cipher Brief Expert Marc Polymeropoulos served 26 years in the CIA before retiring from the Senior Intelligence Service in June 2019.  His positions included field and headquarters operational assignments covering the Middle East, Europe, Eurasia and Counterterrorism. 

Christian: What’s top of mind for you this week in the world of national security?

Polymeropoulos:  Havana Syndrome, CIA’s response to the Afghan withdrawal, and the visit of Jordan’s King Abdullah to D.C. Let’s start with Havana Syndrome.

You saw in the press the last couple of days, the notion that the CIA’s inspector general is conducting a review of CIA’s handling of healthcare, of how officers were coming to them starting in 2016 after these attacks started in Cuba. I think that’s a good thing. It’s a necessary evil. I think a lot of your listeners and readers know that I was affected by this in December of 2017. It caused my retirement in July of 2019. I’ve been very vocal on the need for healthcare for our officers.  We have to think about Havana Syndrome in three bins.

The first, is accountability and that’s good. It’s a necessary evil, but we have to look at how the agency responded to officers because that’s critical. The agency workforce is watching. I think the IG review by the CIA is good as well as a look at what’s happening in the House and Senate oversight committees as well.

The second, is continued healthcare for officers, the officers getting to Walter Reed’s National Intrepid Center of Excellence. CIA Director Bill Burns is doing that, so that’s positive.

And then the last piece is culpability. I think you also saw recently in the press, that a senior intelligence service officer who was integral in the hunt for Osama bin Laden, has been named to the task force. So, a lot of stuff is happening on Havana Syndrome, I think all of it is moving in a positive direction. I applaud Director Burns. This is something that I think is going to be at the top of the news cycle for days, weeks, and months to come.

Christian: Do you feel like now there’s a unified awareness at the entire government level outside of CIA?  Is Congress focused on this? Is the White House focused on this in the ways that you think they need to be?

Polymeropoulos: What a great question. The White House for sure. Congress has been absolutely integral both in the Senate and the House. They’re about to pass the Havana Act, which is going to provide financial relief for officers affected, but in all US government agencies. I will say that the Department of State has been woefully behind and that’s a big concern of mine. I feel for my State colleagues. There are 41 State Department officers who have been affected by this. Secretary of State Blinken has not even met with them while Director Burns has met with nearly all of the CIA victims, so State’s got a long way to go. I think we’ll look to the White House and to Congress to keep the pressure on.

Christian: These are events that are still occurring, even as they’re being investigated. Tell us a little bit about the latest that’s happened on the attack front.

Polymeropoulos: I think you see what the press reports of what can only be considered a kind of slow-rolling mass casualty event in Vienna, Austria. There were numerous State Department and intelligence officers affected at our Embassy there. Again, this is coming out in the press, so it’s important to note that. But these things are still happening and I think that we have to look back to the old counter-terrorism model that CIA employed so effectively of detect, disrupt, and deter attacks by our terrorist adversaries. We have to apply that same type of mindset to this problem set.


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Christian: The Afghanistan withdrawal, there’s a lot going on there. We’ve seen reports of US airstrikes supporting Afghan forces in Kandahar. This week, it was reported that just under 50 Afghan troops requested refuge in Pakistan when their border posts near Chitral, which is a Pakistani city, was overrun. The Pakistani government let them in. And we’re seeing now an Afghan strategy focusing on protecting the capital regions and maybe ceding some of those provincial capitals.

Polymeropoulos: I look at this from a narrow optic. As a former CIA officer who was the base chief in Afghanistan between 2011 and 2012, I ran one of our paramilitary bases in eastern Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan. What is unique about life as a CIA officer out in the field, particularly in the bases, was that there were only a few of us. We had a very small number of Americans, yet we had hundreds, if not over 1,000 Afghanistan indigenous personnel, whether they were troops who were fighting with us or whether they were support personnel.  We lived with them. I think this is a little bit different than perhaps big US military’s experience with the Afghan national army.

I trusted my life to these guys. They were armed in front of us all the time. We ate together at the mess hall. We sat around the fire pit together, certainly went on patrols together. So, it’s really personal for me. I remember our Afghan interpreters. I remember our indigenous personnel and I really worry about them. The future, I think is one that certainly is bleak. I don’t support the administration’s decision for a full withdrawal. I don’t understand why we couldn’t have left a residual force, but that policy decision has been made.  I think that the things I’m looking to in the near future are even after the end of August, will the US military still conduct airstrikes in support of Afghan forces?  There is something about betraying those who really made that pact with us. That’s just something as a CIA officer that’s ingrained in us that we don’t want to do that. So, this is something I really worry about. I remember the faces of our interpreters and indigenous personnel every day. These were great heroes. I think a lot of us at CIA wouldn’t be alive today without their heroism.


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Christian: The third issue you raised was interesting, the visit to D.C. by Jordan’s King Abdullah. It didn’t get a lot of press.  But you say it’s a significant story.  Tell us why.

Polymeropoulos: President Biden has had a long-standing relationship with King Abdullah. It’s a sign that Jordan is back. We call Jordan the lily pad for the United States for a lot of reasons. I mean, when you think back to 2006 and Jordan’s integral role in the Anbar Awakening, that’s when we were rallying the tribes in Iraq to fight terrorism. When you think about how the US has access to strategic bases in Jordan and when you think about the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate as one of the US Government’s most critical counter-terrorism partners. But the fact of the matter is that under the last administration, Jordan was not treated well, so it’s really significant that Abdullah was here. I think this is a really good thing. Don’t forget that CIA Director Bill Burns was ambassador in Amman quite some time ago. I think this is a really positive development, not only for the United States going back to an old strategic partner, but also for Jordan as well, which has been a steadfast ally not only during King Abdullah’s reign, but also of course, under King Hussein before him.

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This piece by General Joseph Votel (Ret.) and Lt. Gen. Michael K. Nagata (Ret.) and was first published by our friends at the Middle East Institute.


Lt. Gen. (ret.) Michael K. Nagata is a distinguished senior fellow on national security at MEI. He retired from the U.S. Army in 2019 after 38 years of active duty, with 34 years in US Special Operations. His final position was director of strategy for the National Counterterrorism Center from 2016 to 2019.

Gen. (ret.) Joseph L. Votel is a distinguished senior fellow on national security at MEI. He retired as a four-star general in the U.S. Army after a nearly 40-year career, during which he held a variety of commands in positions of leadership, including most recently as commander of CENTCOM from March 2016 to March 2019. 


OPINION – The United States and Pakistan have had a complex and often disappointing “love-hate” relationship since 1947 — one severely tested during the 20-year U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan. We believe the time has come for serious policy consideration of whether and how both nations can achieve a more strategically beneficial and sustainable post-intervention relationship between the American and Pakistani governments and their populations.

As we consider a new policy, the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan after two decades of leading the international coalition is almost complete. Early indications are that Afghanistan is increasingly likely to descend into significant instability and possibly serious fracture, which will have unwelcome consequences for the Afghan people and all of Afghanistan’s neighbors. It is already clear that international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State-Khorasan Province will continue to enjoy and probably grow their safe havens.

Whatever U.S. strategic concerns may be about the future of Afghanistan, the course and direction of Pakistan’s strategic choices in coming years will also matter to the United States. There are a variety of reasons for this.

First, Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state. Decades of investments in nuclear weapons by Pakistan and India, compounded by unrelenting and mutual historical, religious, cultural, and political antagonism between them, make this one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints.

Second, all of the countries Pakistan borders are consequential for the U.S. Pakistan also has significant religious, cultural, and economic ties to other Muslim states such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In an era of “great power competition,” while Pakistan may not be one of the principal players, its network of relationships can be of strategic benefit to any of the great powers now involved, including the U.S. and China.

Third, despite its significant political and economic difficulties, Pakistan has a growing technology sector. Its youthful population and worldwide diaspora of Pakistani doctors, scientists, academics, and other professionals have become an increasingly important part of the global community.


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As long-time veterans of South Asia, both of us understand the sources of “weariness and wariness” that U.S. policymakers, in both Democratic and Republican administrations, often associate with strategic discussions of Pakistan. We have both seen the U.S. government’s reluctance toward undertaking any kind of strategic interaction or rapprochement with Pakistan because of previous disappointments or perceived betrayals. Understanding the enormous complexities of Pakistan’s relationships, influence, and strategic choices in the South Asia milieu can be intellectually challenging and draining.

Yet, we have both concluded that the only thing harder than establishing a functional and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan is living without one. Given unstable borders, a nuclear standoff with India, the continued presence of terrorist organizations, and the high potential for all of this to further disrupt our interests, there is no better alternative.

Among those areas that we believe worth exploring with the Pakistanis are these:

First, the possibility of planning, along with other like-minded international actors (both state and non-state), to manage the consequences of significant political instability and human suffering emerging from Afghanistan, including the possibility of substantial refugee flight into Pakistan. Indeed, the Pakistanis have long and miserable memories of the surge of Afghan refugees after the Kabul government collapsed in the 1990s and have consistently expressed deep concerns about a possible repeat resulting from the U.S. withdrawal now nearing its completion.

Second, the possibility of counterterrorism cooperation against any terrorist threat that emerges from Afghanistan and prevents it from sowing further instability across the region. We do not consider it likely that Pakistan will allow any positioning of U.S. intelligence or counterterrorism elements within its borders. Still, there may be other ways (e.g., working groups, forums, or exchanges) to foster better cooperation if a threat emerges from Afghanistan that is of concern to our mutual interests.

Third, the possibility of enlisting Pakistan cooperation, and that of India, toward some type of partial de-escalation of tensions along their common border and, with it, even a slight amelioration of the nuclear weapons threat. It is instructive to recall that, before 9/11, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee initiated a dialogue about the de-escalation of tensions that included the highly emotional issue of Kashmir. However, talks broke down without significant agreement. While we recognize this is an extraordinarily complex and fraught issue for the U.S. to embrace, given all of its other strategic challenges, the specter of a potential nuclear conflict in South Asia should at a minimum prompt us to ask ourselves, “why not at least try?” Indeed, U.S. antagonists such as China would probably take a dim view of such efforts, and we believe that might be a reason for doing so rather than a reason to flinch from it.


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We have long heard U.S. policy and operational practitioners cite phrases such as “never underestimate the Pakistanis’ ability to disappoint us.” But, unfortunately, most American policymakers do not understand how often we have heard the Pakistanis say the same thing about Americans. Thus, both sides have longstanding “neuralgias” about the other. As we end our Afghan campaign, now is the time to move beyond our neuralgias and carefully weigh the strategic costs of whether trying to somehow partner with Pakistan is more, or less, than the cost of failing to do so. We believe, in the long run, it is likely to be less costly.

The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors.

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The Middle East has demanded Washington’s attention on an almost weekly basis since President Biden took office in January. Since then, the White House has made the decision to speed up the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, has been faced with militia attacks in Iraq, Hamas attacks on Israel, the collapse of Lebanon, political instability in Jordan, OPEC issues, a political crisis in Tunisia, Houthi rejection of diplomacy in Yemen, Iran’s refusal to return to the nuclear deal, and most recently, attacks believed to be perpetrated by Iran against  tanker ships. This of course, is occurring as COVID continues to ravage regional economies and undermine the stability of fragile states. And let’s not forget that Al Qaeda and ISIS remain active throughout the region.

The Cipher Brief tapped Expert Norman Roule for insights into what all of this means for the Biden Administration and the rest of us in the coming months.

Norman T. Roule, Middle East Expert, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI

Norman Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East.   He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017.  As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policy makers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.

The Cipher Brief: Let’s start broadly.  The Biden Administration has had a lot to deal with in the Middle East since the president took office in January.  How are they doing?

Roule:  I think it’s too early to assesses the administration’s performance. The Biden administration arrived with several broad goals. It promised to reduce American military forces in the region, rely more on diplomacy and cooperation with Europe to resolve regional problems, and adjust relations with long-time regional partners like Israel and Saudi Arabia. But the challenges of the region are long-standing and routinely intrude upon Washington’s foreign policy agenda. And U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has become a sharply partisan issue.

The administration’s response to events that have transpired in the region since the beginning of the year, has reassured those who looked for a greater emphasis on diplomacy. Washington assigned experienced envoys to contain multi-party issues and coordinated with Europe to limit U.S. involvement. The Secretary of State and his deputy have made high-profile visits to the region. The President has hosted such leaders as the King of Jordan and the Prime Minister of Iraq. And National Security Council engagement with Israel is routine. U.S. military shifts have taken place, but the administration still prioritizes security cooperation with regional partners. However, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is perceived by many as precipitous. Others worry that the U.S. has joined Europe in overlooking Iran’s attempts to change the political DNA of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The U.S. response to the Houthi’s use of Iran-supplied missiles and drones against civilian targets remains mainly rhetorical despite the lethal threat this poses to Saudis, Americans, and others living in the Kingdom.

The Cipher Brief:  That’s a sobering review. Is there any good news from the region for this administration?

Roule:  Actually, quite a bit. The administration has found that regional states will collaborate on complex issues beyond the region. Qatar plays a unique role in U.S. Afghan policy. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are essential partners in resolving East African crises.

Regional leaders place great value on security cooperation as well as robust engagement with the U.S. private sector. Al-Qaeda and ISIS remain a threat, but at a fraction of their past potency.

Long-overdue political and economic reforms continue, albeit not at the pace or scale some Western observers seek. Saudi Arabia has introduced notable human rights reforms. A growing number of countries in the region have undertaken high-profile efforts to combat corruption and reshape their economies. Oman has begun the long road to restructuring its economy. Iraq and Libya remain intact despite their fractious polities.

I think the administration has also been impressed by the efforts of the Gulf states to diversify their economies, particularly in the area of green energy. The visits by U.S. Climate Envoy Secretary Kerry have been quite popular, probably more than some expected. I see plenty of momentum for growth here. 


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The Cipher Brief: The Iranian nuclear talks appear to have stalled. How did this happen? And what will it take for Iran to return to the deal?

Roule: Iran will return to the nuclear deal when it first believes it has wrung every concession out of the West in order to shield its economy from sanctions that could follow its non-nuclear aggression. It will also seek to ensure that it has fatally compromised the U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions within the nuclear deal itself. The Biden administration pledged a return to the deal as written, an end to the maximum pressure policy of its predecessor, and a rejection of regime change. More broadly, it also announced an intention to reduce the U.S. military presence in the region, a reassessment of Washington’s relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and support for regional engagement with Iran. Some believe that the administration may even have turned a blind eye to Chinese purchases of Iranian oil as a signal to Tehran of Washington’s goodwill. If reasonable leaders ruled Iran, all of this should have produced an early return to the deal. But Iran’s leaders are rarely seen as reasonable. Iran could have chosen a fast return to the deal. Instead, it pushed for what all members of the P5+1 agree are unreasonable demands.

At this point, conditions aren’t favorable for an Iranian return to the deal in the near term. First, Tehran has pocketed all the benefits offered by the Biden administration’s initial approach without any concessions of its own.

We should also consider that Iran’s leaders may not want to return to the deal. Tehran’s primary goal in the 2015 nuclear deal was to obtain sanctions protections against the most vulnerable sectors of its economy in exchange for constraints on its civilian nuclear program. Tehran found that an end of nuclear sanctions did not solve the economic problems which produced domestic unrest, nor did the imposition of sanctions threaten the regime. Sanctions indeed constrained Iran’s ability to support proxies in the region, but even this was tolerable for the regime.

Next, Iran’s economy has stabilized somewhat in recent months. It remains in terrible shape but not so bad that the survival of the system is in question.

Last, we need to remember that Iran has historically offered concessions when confronted by a united international threat. Whatever your views on the nuclear deal, its very existence fragments international unity against Iran, which has always been a critical goal for Iran’s leaders. Support of the deal may bring us closer to Europe, Russia, and China but inevitably make regional partners believe we have ignored their valid security interests since there is little reason to believe Iran will moderate its non-nuclear behavior. Opposition to the nuclear talks may win support from Israel and Iran’s neighbors but it also invites friction with Europe, Russia, and China. These countries generally reject non-economic coercion against Iran and say relatively little about Iran’s regional adventurism.

The Cipher Brief: With a new president, will Iran’s new leadership continue to participate in the nuclear talks?  What will it take for Iran to return to the deal?

Roule: I believe Tehran will remain in the talks, but it will likely use the coming weeks to project defiance and even a willingness to walk away. The developing crisis over Iran’s naval attacks in the Arabian Sea may also postpone engagement. But for Iran, talks are a net positive. In addition to significant sanctions relief, the talks allow Iran – a mid-sized country – to routinely engage the attention of the world’s powers and play these actors against each other. This engagement also brings de facto recognition of the Raisi government, no small thing given his bloody background. The talks allow the Raisi government to argue directly with senior European counterparts that new sanctions for its many non-nuclear crimes would prevent it from returning to the nuclear deal. Last, the talks will give the Raisi government a platform for defiant rhetoric that will unsettle its adversaries and satisfy domestic supporters.

The Cipher Brief:  So, what circumstances would compel Iran to return to the deal?

Roule:  I can think of two paths that lead to an Iranian return once the new regime has vented defiant rhetoric. First, Tehran would need to believe that its rejection of the deal and malign regional actions had unified the international community to collectively support renewed economic pressure. Second, if Iran’s economy or political dynamic suffers a downturn that Tehran’s leaders perceive as leading to the downfall of the Islamic Republic. Either will need to include face-saving concessions.

The Cipher Brief: How should we look at current unrest in Iran?

Roule: The ongoing unrest shows no sign of being a near-term threat to the regime.  The crowd sizes appear manageable and anti-regime violence has so far been minimal. Security forces are relatively well organized and they are unsympathetic to protestors. The main weakness of protest remains that the opposition lacks direction, leadership, and support by labor groups. There appear to be no external or internal power centers capable of challenging the Supreme Leader.

We shouldn’t overlook the fact that many Iranians do support the regime. Despite a historically low turnout and Raisi’s admitted record of blood, eighteen million Iranians voted for him. It has become routine to see videos from Iran in which women argue that they cannot be forced to wear a hijab. But the same videos show other Iranian women (and men) asserting that failure to do so violates Iranian law and culture.

The current unrest did have aspects that likely worry Tehran. Oil workers put down their tools, and sympathy strikes reportedly erupted in major cities, albeit not on a scale that threatened the regime. The grievances of the Iranian people are so reasonable that they are increasingly acknowledged as such by government officials. But conditions in Iran are unlikely to improve. COVID continues to wreak havoc while climate change makes water and electricity shortages more painful. For these reasons, unrest will continue and probably intensify.


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The Cipher Brief: What do you expect President Raisi to accomplish domestically, regionally, and internationally in his first 100 days in office?

Roule: Domestically, he will take steps to show how he will sustain Iran’s revolutionary spirit during what many believe to be a period of transition to a new generation of leaders. We will see this initially play out in his ministerial selections as part of a broader campaign to staff the bureaucracy with ideologically sound personnel, especially those with a background in the Revolutionary Guard. Security services and the military are very likely to see strong support. He will want to show that he is taking steps to address COVID and the economy. Programs directed at the poor are likely to be a priority, but he will have no sympathy for protestors. I wouldn’t be surprised if he announced an anti-corruption campaign and targeted members of the Rouhani administration for its initial investigations. We will also continue to see efforts to prepare Iran’s oil sector so that Tehran can quickly ramp up oil sales once sanctions end. Last, he is likely to support growing regime control of the internet. A bill calling for such control is currently before the parliament.

The Cipher Brief:  What about foreign policy?

Roule:  I don’t anticipate many changes in foreign policy. Raisi will mouth support for regional engagement but will maintain a defiant attitude towards the West, animus toward the U.S., support for proxies, and suspicion – but likely not rejection – of the nuclear talks. We need to be clear that he sees any sanctions relief as a transactional issue. Much as in 2015, Tehran will be clear that it will not allow a new deal to transform Iran’s society or its relations with the West.

The Cipher Brief: What are your thoughts on what would constitute an effective U.S. strategy to deter Iran’s regional activities, such as continued attacks on maritime trade, proxy support for attacks on Saudi Arabia, and activities in Yemen and Syria?  Can you imagine a scenario when the U.S. might engage militarily?

Roule: Our strategy must involve our international partners. We should avoid anything that makes it appear as if this is a U.S-Iran conflict instead of Iranian actions that threaten multiple countries and their citizens. The question becomes, will the international community join us or stand back while the U.S. takes the hard steps needed to contain Iran. Sanctions certainly deprive Iran of resources it would use for its proxies, but sanctions alone will not end Iran’s belligerence. The

The Cipher Brief:  What are Iran’s likely plans in Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal? What worries you the most?

Roule: There is plenty about Afghanistan to worry everyone, but I won’t dwell on the issues that are covered well in The Cipher Brief by others.  Iran has enjoyed the security stability that came with our presence. Now they have the Taliban on their border. Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani has considerable experience in Afghanistan. Iran’s security forces will likely engage the Taliban, Afghan governments, and warlords in equal measure to ensure that Iran can exert some influence over each. Iran is likely to transfer some portion of its Afghan proxies in Syria to western Afghanistan to protect Iran’s interests.

One issue that concerns me is the fate of the al-Qaeda cell in Iran. Tehran has enabled an Al-Qaeda presence on its territory for years without any international cost. That presence may well choose to migrate back to Afghanistan to reconstitute its former power center. The international community should hold Iran responsible if this happens. After all of the blood and treasure spent in the war on terror, we cannot tolerate Iran enabling al-Qaeda’s resurgence.

The Cipher Brief:  It feels like that would be an incredible regression.  Let’s shift to energy issues. Where do energy markets stand in the wake of the OPEC deal? And what do you think are the main drivers?


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Roule: Three baskets of drivers now define energy markets. First, the fundamentals. Here we are watching steady draws on stockpiles, production remains below what the market could absorb, and supplies will be tight for the remainder of the year. U.S. producers appear generally focused on return on equity vice expansion, which will likely mean that we will produce around two million BPD of oil less this year than last year. U.S. rig count is about double what it was a year ago at this time but is growing only slowly. It likely dropped slightly a week ago. Capital investment in the oil industry plummeted in 2020. Shareholders are pressing company leaders to use profits from restored oil prices to invest in green technology. OPEC policy remains conservative in the face of variables including; when Iran and Venezuela will resume production, the question of whether inflation has returned, and the impact of investor speculation.

Second, COVID is here to stay even in the best-case scenarios. The international community has failed to come close to a uniform approach to social distancing, travel, and economic reopening. We tend to look at this through a national perspective, but it may be insightful to look regionally to see how COVID-D shuts down specific industries as it spreads globally. Fresh COVID lockdowns in China have combined with signs of a decline in Chinese manufacturing to restrain prices.

Finally, geopolitical developments have generally had only a temporary impact on price pressures, but I worry about events in the Middle East. Expansion of Iranian attacks in strategic waterways with significant commercial and energy traffic may be more consequential. Insurance costs may increase for an industry with tight profit margins. Worse, attacks against only a few large container ships would disrupt global supply chains. We are moving into a new age when the importance of the Middle East may be as significant in terms of transportation security as it is in terms of energy.

The Cipher Brief:  So, let’s put you on the spot. What is your outlook for prices in the coming months?

Roule: Let me give this my best shot. Absent a sudden economic downturn, widespread COVID lockdowns, or conflict in the Middle East, we should see a continuation of the upward price velocity seen over recent months. This trend should sustain prices in the mid $70s and even low $80s. Several factors make upward movement beyond that problematic. First, OPEC leaders would be reluctant to invite the inflationary (and thus political) pressures such a spike would entail.  The Saudis will continue to push for market stability which dominates their strategy.  Second, India – and possibly China – would draw upon their strategic reserves if prices moved that high. Finally, such a price would draw out producers in the U.S. and OPEC + who would not be able to pass on a chance for a spike in revenue.


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CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT PERSPECTIVE 

Cipher Brief Expert Tim Willasey-Wilsey served for over 27 years in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He is now Visiting Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London.

Older Americans have Saigon 1975 and the helicopters from the Embassy roof seared into their memories. A previous generation of Britons was haunted by the image of General Percival surrendering vast numbers of troops and equipment in Singapore to the Japanese in 1942. How Kabul falls to the Taliban could have important practical and symbolic significance.

The announcement that the United States is sending 3,000 troops to Kabul alongside 600 British troops to manage the evacuation of their civilians and those Afghans who provided assistance, is a remarkably late response to a rapidly deteriorating situation. Unless carried out in the next 48 hours, it will also be risky. Taliban infiltrators are already inside Kabul and the forces which captured Ghazni and Kandahar on 12th August will be heading towards the capital on their Honda 125cc motorbikes.

The US must have extracted undertakings from the Taliban negotiators in Qatar not to launch their full assault on Kabul until the evacuations are complete, but elements of doubt remain. Previous Taliban assurances have proved worthless, and it is doubtful that individual Taliban commanders would wish to hold back while some of Ashraf Ghani’s ministers, senior army officers, judges and officials are spirited away to a life of exile.

It is hard not to be impressed by the speed and élan of the Taliban’s recent successes; taking 13 of Afghanistan’s 34 regional capitals in almost as many days. It is reminiscent of the extraordinary progress which the Japanese made down the Malaya Peninsula in 1942 with Singapore as the ultimate prize.

The Taliban’s success has not happened by chance. It is clearly the fruit of preparation and planning. Above all, they have learnt from the experience of 1994 to 1996 when they eventually took Kabul but failed to capture the north, thereby allowing space for the Northern Alliance parties to survive and then reassert themselves following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

This time, the Taliban have focussed first on border posts with neighbouring countries (thereby denying the government vital supply routes and customs revenues) before taking outlying regional capitals and leaving Kabul (which is never easy to capture) until last. Above all, they have concentrated on the north where many rural Afghans are disenchanted with the Kabul government and regional warlords. The north is no longer the solid bastion of anti-Taliban sentiment it was in the 1990s.


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Taliban progress in the north has snuffed out any chance that the old Northern Alliance could be reborn out of the eventual collapse of the Ashraf Ghani government. Whereas in 1996, Ahmed Shah Massoud, its brilliant military leader, was able to abandon Kabul and beat a tactical retreat up the Panjshir Valley, that option barely exists today. Not only is Massoud dead but his former adherents are no longer guerrilla fighters but members of a stratified Afghan army which has struggled to perform without US air support.

The Taliban have also ruthlessly exploited the weak negotiating stance of the United States and its chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad. Whereas some of the Taliban team in Doha, such as Mullah Barader, may indeed have been ‘moderates’ there was never any doubt that the Taliban movement wanted to see the total defeat of the Kabul government and the expulsion of Western forces. Pakistan too, may have occasionally considered some form of negotiated deal but ultimately the only sure way of keeping Indian influence out of Afghanistan (it believes) is a Taliban government.

The Afghan army (and in particular its impressive Special Forces) will now be assembling in Kabul and should be able to repel initial attempts to overrun the city. Certainly, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar found it impossible to take Kabul in 1992 and 1993 even with help from Pakistan, which, in frustration, switched support to the newly-created Taliban movement in late 1994.

But from 1992 to 1996 there were frequent deliveries of supplies to Massoud and his Northern Alliance defenders from Russia, Iran, and India. In 2021, the position is very different. Russia has already decided to “back the winner” and believes it has extracted promises from the Taliban not to export Islamism northwards into the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Iran too has channels to the Taliban and will be watching carefully for any return to the Taliban’s persecution of the Shia Hazaras. And India has already made contact with the Taliban in Doha in the hope that the Taliban in power will prevent Kashmiri militant groups from setting up bases there.

The likelihood therefore is that Kabul will fall to the Taliban quite quickly. If the Americans and British do manage to insert their evacuation forces soon, they should be able to complete the operation successfully, although there are likely to be heart-rending scenes at the airport as crowds of refugees are turned away at gunpoint from departing aircraft. Regional powers, particularly Pakistan, will try and persuade the Taliban to hold back from intervening, conscious that a bloodbath in Kabul would be a disastrous start to the Taliban’s second spell in government. Ironically, however, the evacuation would almost certainly lead to the collapse of the Kabul government as senior officials are forced to decide whether to take the last aircraft out or face almost certain torture and death at the hands of the victors. It is doubtful whether any Western countries will choose to retain their embassies in Kabul. For President Biden, the memory of Benghazi will be too raw.

What is certain is that there will be new iconic images to rival those of Saigon and Singapore.


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General Joseph L. Votel (Ret.) joined BENS as CEO & President in January 2020 following a 39-year military career where he commanded special operations and conventional forces at every level; last serving as the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) where he was responsible for U.S. and coalition military operations in the Middle East, Levant, and Central and South Asia. General Votel’s career included combat in Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq and he led the 79-member coalition that successfully liberated Iraq and Syria from the Islamic State Caliphate. General Votel preceded his assignment at CENTCOM with service as the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and the Joint Special Operations Command.

The Cipher Brief:  Did you ever envision that the U.S. would pull out so quickly or completely leaving the Afghan military on its own without U.S. air support?  

General Votel: I did not anticipate this during my time – but once the President sets a hard departure date – then a fast withdrawal is inevitable.  No Commander wants to accept unnecessary risk with troops on the ground when you are up against a clearly articulated departure date.

The Cipher Brief: Intelligence assessments wildly missed the mark on how fast Kabul would fall, what factors contributed most directly to this? 

General Votel: Certainly, the departure of our own capabilities is a big part of this; the lack of direct contact with Afghan leaders is another important factor; and, of course, once it was clear that we were departing (and took our Commander out) — we lost priority and access with our normal and reliable Afghan intelligence sources.

The Cipher Brief: U.S. personnel are facing a deteriorating security situation at the Kabul airport while U.S. forces are still deploying for the contingency operation, another sign that the administration underestimated how fast the Taliban would reach Kabul. The U.S. could have chosen to slow the Taliban advance using airpower, why didn’t it happen, do you think? 


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General Votel: I think it is very clear that this was no longer a priority for our Government.  The mission right now, at least articulated over the weekend, is about supporting evacuation of the diplomats and helping with the departure of those Afghans who assisted the US and meet the criteria for evacuation.  While I don’t know this for certain — I believe what we were trying to do with over the horizon air support in a rapidly developing situation, was not optimal or overly effective.  It doesn’t seem to have done much – if anything.

The Cipher Brief: The U.S. has allowed U.S. supplied military hardware, weapons and technology to fall into the hands of the Taliban, a group responsible for the deaths of U.S. personnel and thousands of innocent Afghans.  The U.S. government holds private citizens and corporations accountable for far lesser violations of export violations involving dual-use technology or military equipment, etc.  How should Americans think about this situation now, where the Taliban will use equipment, paid for the by the U.S. taxpayer, to potentially perpetrate acts of violence against U.S. interests, and erode democratic values that the U.S. tried to introduce to Afghanistan?  

General Votel: Not sure on this.  Unfortunately, it is not the first time we have seen this — remember ISIS in 2014, in Mosul?  I suspect these will be more trophy pieces than they will be hard military capability – with the exception of small arms, mortars, and artillery.  Most of this will be difficult for the Taliban to sustain – and they probably prefer their own gear, anyway.

The Cipher Brief:  There is a lot of anger among the national security community right now.  What would you say to individuals who have suffered because of the U.S. role in Afghanistan, who may be feeling anger and rage?  

General Votel: I can’t really comment on anger in the national security community — I am sure that exists, but the sentiment that seems more strong to me, is disappointment.  No one wants what we are seeing now.  I think most security professionals can accept a decision to depart by the Commander in Chief — that is well within his authority, and everyone understands this; what is harder to accept is the manner in which this happened, and how it has played out.  It was hard for me to watch Taliban sitting at a conference table that I once sat at with the Afghan President.  In a number of public engagements, I have participated in lately – people have asked me if this whole effort was a waste.  My response has been consistent.  American military personnel, members of the IC and the diplomatic corps conducted themselves honorably throughout this war.  They responded when the Nation called and did their best for our Country, each other, and the Afghan people.  There will be plenty of time to place the blame – but the vast, vast majority of Americans who participated in some aspect of the Afghan War did so nobly and to the best of their ability.  We should not lose sight of this.  That this did not turn out the way we all hoped — is not their fault … and I would not want anyone (especially families of our wounded and killed) to think these efforts were in vain.  That is not how I thought about them at the time, and it is not how I think about them now.  They answered when the Nation called.

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As the U.S. works toward getting more 11,000 Americans, diplomats and Afghan allies out of the country, what kind of Taliban should the U.S. expect to deal with in Afghanistan?  So far, there have been assurances from the Taliban that a new regime may not be as brutal as regimes past, but few who have worked with the Taliban believe the assurances.  How might the regime work with, or shelter groups like al-Qaeda, which is the reason why the U.S. entered into Afghanistan after 9/11.  And how might a massive-scale exodus of Afghans impact neighboring countries?

The Cipher Brief sat down with the former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norman T. Roule to get his expert-level perspective.

Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI

Cipher Brief Expert Norm Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017.  As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policy makers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.

The Cipher Brief: How would you characterize the international community’s response to the Taliban victory in Afghanistan?

Roule:  Historians of the future will likely describe the response to the Taliban victory as a strange mix of apathy and confusion.

In terms of apathy, there is extraordinary irony in the fact that after spending so much blood and treasure to defeat Da’esh efforts to establish an extremist Islamic Republic in Syria and impose its oppression over Iraqis and Syrians, the international community failed to prevent the creation of an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan. Many of the arguments behind our involvement in Syria – from a refugee crisis to the need to deny international Islamic militants a home to birth new terror groups – apply to Afghanistan. Whether or not one supported this decision, it is hard to avoid thinking that this episode will embolden militants worldwide.

In terms of confusion, we seem to be unable to accept that no one can predict the course and pace of crowd dynamics that so quickly eroded Afghan resistance. We live in a world where people acknowledge their inability to predict who will win our presidential elections but insist the Intelligence Community can somehow predict the day events will occur in a denied environment. But such a worst-case possibility should have been part of the planning deck and resourced on the ground accordingly.

The Cipher Brief: How would you expect the international community to respond in the coming days?

Roule: Absent a Taliban attack, operations at the airport should proceed more smoothly as our response architecture grows. Beyond that, much depends on how the Taliban act in the coming weeks. The group is not a monolith. Their success was highly likely as much a surprise to them as anyone. As they define their path and choose their leaders, there will be internal debates, jockeying for power, and perhaps some violent infighting.

In terms of indicators of the regime’s direction, we may want to consider the following questions:

First and foremost, how will the Taliban respond to our ongoing evacuation? Thus far, they seem willing to let us leave untouched, probably believing that the sooner we get out, the easier it will be for them to take control. At the same time, international media coverage of the evacuation will impose a strategic embarrassment on Washington.

Second, to what extent have the Taliban changed? They certainly understand that diplomacy played a role in their victory. Some of their leaders have spent hundreds of hours with foreign diplomats and traveled to multiple foreign capitals. How will these leaders merge such experiences into governance with more insular colleagues? They are likely to talk initially about compromise regarding women’s rights and inclusion of opponents in the government, but this may well be another effort to buy time. The international community has few pressure points over the group. How this plays out will be a good indicator of how they plan to run the country.

Next, how will they handle the issue of al-Qaida and other terrorists? We cannot overlook the deep connections between the Taliban and al-Qaida. If they believe the international community will limit its response to demarches, press statements, and empty sanctions, many in the group will be inclined to allow al-Qaida to reorganize.

Last, I would look at the refugee issue. They are likely to welcome external aid and allow at least some humanitarian groups to remain in country. Doing so requires no political concessions, addresses a domestic headache, and provides an opportunity for corruption. Humanitarian groups also offer a lever the Taliban can use against the West, i.e., refrain from criticizing us, or we will block your humanitarian operations. The Houthis have done this with great effect in Yemen.


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The Cipher Brief: How do you think will China, Russia, and other adversaries will respond to the withdrawal? 

Roule: Chinese propagandists have aggressively exploited our evacuation from Afghanistan. Its media is already claiming that these events show Taiwan that “once war breaks out in the Straits, the island’s defense will collapse in hours, and the US military won’t come to respond.” China’s press has also reportedly announced that the U.S. will not stand by Hong Kong activists.

Beijing, Tehran, and their proxies will likely point to the withdrawal as evidence that the U.S. is a declining power, unwilling or incapable of defending its friends. It will be lost on no one that whereas the U.S. has abandoned Afghanistan, Russia, China, and Iran have not wavered in support of their – admittedly few and otherwise isolated – allies.

In a worse case, if our adversaries believe the withdrawal reflects a lack of national resolve, they may be tempted to test our will on other issues. In this case, a miscalculation could lead to a conventional war in another theater.

The Cipher Brief: What would you say to those who say that the withdrawal demonstrates that the U.S. will only focus on strategic interests?

Roule:  Certainly, this argument has an appeal. It is true that our strategic adversaries like nothing better than the U.S. expending resources and diplomatic energy in such areas as Afghanistan, in part because we are, in essence, protecting their interests for free. But it does beg two questions.

First, what will happen differently next year regarding China, Russia, efforts to combat climate change, and cyber actors, now that we are out of Afghanistan? Second, what exactly is a U.S. strategic interest that we would protect? Estonia? Bahrain? Taiwan?

This argument also glosses over how others respond to such a posture. If a country perceives itself outside the international community’s protection, it will likely accommodate an aggressor. Our next call for a coalition of the willing will likely meet with less enthusiasm.

U.S. influence depends on the respect shown to us in multiple arenas. The echoes of this localized respect become self-reinforcing. We should think about what happens to collective international security if these echoes are silenced.

Last, this argument inherently argues that values are strategic interests. Unless violence directly touches Americans, we will limit our response to diplomacy and public statements. Such protests are unlikely to stop those behind a future Srebrenica massacre or the Rwandan genocide. Indeed, one can make a case that such a response might even encourage such events.

The Cipher Brief: How can the U.S. now best demonstrate its national resolve?

Roule:  As the saying goes, the best way to demonstrate national resolve is to demonstrate national resolve. Fair or not, this episode will tar the Biden administration. It doesn’t help that some allies reportedly have complained that the U.S. did not sufficiently consult with them on its decision to withdraw. Public criticism of the withdrawal decision by some of our closest European partners is growing. Adversaries will now consider their action through the lens of Afghanistan, much as the post-Vietnam malaise encouraged Soviet aggression in the 1970s.

I am not saying that we can’t reverse this situation. The U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984 caused many to question U.S. resolve. Although it did signal an end to U.S. (and international) efforts to eradicate Hezbollah, Reagan’s actions in other arenas (to include Afghanistan) restored the image of U.S. national resolve. Difficult diplomacy and a demonstration of our willingness to use military power when needed lay ahead.


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The Cipher Brief: What does the return of the Taliban mean for al-Qaeda?

Roule:  There is little reason to believe the Taliban-Al-Qaida relationship will not resume, although al-Qaeda is a fragmented and a pale version of its original stature. Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine the delight of its remaining leadership and cadres. Elements in Iran will likely seek to return to Afghanistan, perhaps assuring Iran that in exchange for tolerance of periodic transit of Iranian territory, the group will use its influence with the Taliban to protect Iran’s interests. We should watch for any signs of a return to Afghanistan by Zawahiri’s deputy, Sayf al-Adel, who is currently in Iran with other members of the group’s leadership council.

But al-Qaeda is not the only actor on this stage. Its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has not appeared for months and has far less influence than Osama Bin Laden. Afghanistan also hosts al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), ISIS, and other groups. The Taliban have emptied Afghanistan’s prisons which held deeply committed and dangerous militants who may gravitate to whatever new militant leadership might arise. But a lethal threat to Americans is sure to appear. The only questions are its size, goals, and reach.

The Cipher Brief: What does the U.S. withdrawal mean for China and Russia?

Roule: Both countries have sought to undercut U.S. influence in Afghanistan. They will each be delighted with the rhetorical violence of our internal debate over the withdrawal. But they also enjoyed the stability our engagement provided in a country so close to their borders.

Both countries have developed relations with the Taliban. I believe each hosted a Taliban delegation in recent weeks. It shouldn’t be lost on us that neither country felt compelled to withdraw its personnel from Kabul. That’s a pretty good sign of their confidence in the relationship.

Outside of Afghanistan, each will use the withdrawal to increase their influence with Central Asian actors – including Turkey. Coordination on terrorism and narcotics issues will come most easily. For example, Uzbekistan will worry that the Taliban will renew support of the violent Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has long maintained a presence in Afghanistan.

China’s concerns will be threefold. Beijing will use economic and diplomatic inducements to ensure that the Taliban do not encourage unrest among China’s oppressed Uighur population, let alone support the East Turkistan Islamic Movement or other Chinese militants in Xinjiang province. Next, Beijing will want to explore the Belt and Road access Afghanistan offers. Last, China will likely test whether it can achieve a commercially viable deal to mine Lithium and other minerals. In that mine operations require many years to develop and a vast amount of capital to construct, such arrangements are likely to be few given Afghanistan’s unpredictable political and security environment.

As for Russia, the U.S. withdrawal offers a chance for greater influence in Central Asia. We should watch for signs of new Russian military bases in the region. Moscow’s concern that Afghanistan will once more become a sanctuary for anti-Russian terrorists will also drive its relationship with the Taliban.

The Cipher Brief: What about Iran and Pakistan?

Roule: Iran has long maintained a relationship with Taliban elements. Reportedly, this involved sanctuary and provision of some weaponry. Tehran’s goals were to hedge its bets in Afghanistan, influence the enemies of the U.S., and protect the Shi’a of Afghanistan.

On the last point, Iran may have much work to do. Taliban personnel reportedly tore down Shi’a posters as they entered Kabul. Tehran must now contend with the consequences of refugees and the rise of warlords on its border.

The current head of Iran’s Qods Force, Esmail Qaani, has considerable experience on Afghan issues, and I expect he will play a prominent role in Iran’s response. We should watch to see how the Qods Force deploys its seasoned Afghan Fatemiyoun proxies from Syria.

Pakistan’s long-time relationship with the Taliban will give it more influence over the group than other countries. But Islamabad also will be on the receiving end of a flood of refugees, renewed militant terrorism in its loosely-controlled border areas, and Western pressure for its support of the Taliban. Ties to the Taliban may also complicate Islamabad’s relationship with India and China.

The Cipher Brief: What does this mean for the U.S. intelligence community?

Roule: The counterterrorism cadre of the US intelligence community and its partners have achieved extraordinary successes in the last years. But their work is now more complicated but no less urgent. For example, our withdrawal has reduced collection streams and potential access when the Afghanistan-based terrorist threat has only begun to grow. This challenge arrives as we shift counterterrorism resources from al-Qaeda to domestic extremists, cyber threats, and China.

The Cipher Brief: Any final comments?

Roule: If I may, I would like to close with a couple of brief comments.

First, we need to do everything we can to support personnel on the ground in Afghanistan. They – and their support teams at home – are trying to restore order in the middle of a hurricane. We are watching heroism at its best.

Next, the narrative of Afghanistan is unsurprisingly partisan. But politics shouldn’t obscure the truth. For more than twenty years, thousands of American and coalition partners volunteered to risk their lives in Afghanistan. We didn’t come to colonize. We didn’t steal Afghan resources. The operational goals were to bring Bin Laden to justice, destroy al-Qaeda, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for the group in the future. We also worked to transform Afghan society. The need for this last effort wasn’t apparent at the outset of our invasion. But it was likely unavoidable if we hoped to satisfy our values and enable Afghan society to confront its militant population. This effort represents the best of our values, and we owe all who served in this arena our most profound respect. Afghans who have participated in their country’s efforts during the past two decades will endure tremendous suffering. But they remain Afghanistan’s best hope and they deserve our support. Last, we need to end the fiction that Afghans didn’t fight for their country. Tens of thousands of Afghans were killed and wounded in the fight against al-Qaeda. Many involved in this fight are reportedly being sought door-to-door by the Taliban. Discounting their efforts may serve a political narrative, but it does them a terrible injustice.

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