A Roadmap for AI in the Intelligence Community

(Editor’s Note: This article was first published by our friends at Just Security and is the fourth in a series that is diving into the foundational barriers to the broad integration of AI in the IC – culture, budget, acquisition, risk, and oversight.  This article considers a new IC approach to risk management.)

OPINION — I have written previously that the Intelligence Community (IC) must rapidly advance its artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities to keep pace with our nation’s adversaries and continue to provide policymakers with accurate, timely, and exquisite insights. The good news is that there is strong bipartisan support for doing so. The not-so-good news is that the IC is not well-postured to move quickly and take the risks required to continue to outpace China and other strategic competitors over the next decade.

In addition to the practical budget and acquisition hurdles facing the IC, there is a strong cultural resistance to taking risks when not absolutely necessary. This is understandable given the life-and-death nature of intelligence work and the U.S. government’s imperative to wisely execute national security funds and activities. However, some risks related to innovative and cutting-edge technologies like AI are in fact necessary, and the risk of inaction – the costs of not pursuing AI capabilities – is greater than the risk of action.

The Need for a Risk Framework

For each incredible new invention, there are hundreds of brilliant ideas that have failed. To entrepreneurs and innovators, “failure” is not a bad word. Rather, failed ideas are often critical steps in the learning process that ultimately lead to a successful product; without those prior failed attempts, that final product might never be created. As former President of India A.P.J. Abdul Kalam once said, “FAIL” should really stand for “First Attempt In Learning.”

The U.S. government, however, is not Silicon Valley; it does not consider failure a useful part of any process, especially when it comes to national security activities and taxpayer dollars. Indeed, no one in the U.S. government wants to incur additional costs or delay or lose taxpayer dollars. But there is rarely a distinction made within the government between big failures, which may have a lasting, devastating, and even life-threatening impact, and small failures, which may be mere stumbling blocks with acceptable levels of impact that result in helpful course corrections.


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As a subcommittee report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) notes “[p]rogram failures are often met with harsh penalties and very public rebukes from Congress which often fails to appreciate that not all failures are the same. Especially with cutting-edge research in technologies … early failures are a near certainty …. In fact, failing fast and adapting quickly is a critical part of innovation.” There is a vital difference between an innovative project that fails and a failure to innovate. The former teaches us something we did not know before, while the latter is a national security risk.

Faced with congressional hearings, inspector general reports, performance evaluation downgrades, negative reputational effects, and even personal liability, IC officers are understandably risk-averse and prefer not to introduce any new risk. That is, of course, neither realistic nor the standard the IC meets today. The IC is constantly managing a multitude of operational risks – that its officers, sources, or methods will be exposed, that it will miss (or misinterpret) indications of an attack, or that it will otherwise fail to produce the intelligence policymakers need at the right time and place. Yet in the face of such serious risks, the IC proactively and aggressively pursues its mission. It recognizes that it must find effective ways to understand, mitigate, and make decisions around risk, and therefore it takes action to make sure potential ramifications are clear, appropriate, and accepted before any failure occurs. In short, the IC has long known that its operations cannot be paralyzed by a zero-risk tolerance that is neither desirable nor attainable. This recognition must also be applied to the ways in which the IC acquires, develops, and uses new technology.

This is particularly important in the context of AI. While AI has made amazing progress in recent years, the underlying technology, the algorithms and their application, are still evolving and the resulting capabilities, by design, will continue to learn and adapt. AI holds enormous promise to transform a variety of IC missions and tasks, but how and when these changes may occur is difficult to forecast and AI’s constant innovation will introduce uncertainty and mistakes. There will be unexpected breakthroughs, as well as failures in areas that initially seemed promising.

The IC must rethink its willingness to take risks in a field where change and failure is embraced as part of the key to future success. The IC must experiment and iterate its progress over time and shift from a culture that punishes even reasonable risk to one that embraces, mitigates, and owns it. This can only be done with a systematic, repeatable, and consistent approach to making risk-conscious decisions.

Today there is no cross-IC mechanism for thinking about risk, let alone for taking it. When considering new activities or approaches, each IC element manages risk through its own lens and mechanisms, if at all. Several individual IC elements have created internal risk assessment frameworks to help officers understand the risks of both action and inaction, and to navigate the decisions they are empowered to make depending upon the circumstances. These frameworks increase confidence that if an activity goes wrong, supervisors all the way up the chain will provide backing as long as the risk was reasonable, well-considered and understood, and the right leaders approved it. And while risk assessments are often not precise instruments of measurement – they reflect the quality of the data, the varied expertise of those conducting the assessments, and the subjective interpretation of the results – regularized and systematic risk assessments are nevertheless a key part of effective risk management and facilitate decision-making at all levels.


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Creating these individual frameworks is commendable and leading-edge for government agencies, but more must be done holistically across the IC. Irregular and inconsistent risk assessments among IC elements will not provide the comfort and certainty needed to drive an IC-wide cultural shift to taking risk. At the same time, the unique nature of the IC, comprised of 18 different elements, each with similar and overlapping, but not identical, missions, roles, authorities, threats and vulnerabilities, does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-all approach.

For this reason, the IC needs a flexible but common strategic framework for considering risk that can apply across the community, with each element having the ability to tailor that framework to its own mission space. Such an approach is not unlike how the community is managed in many areas today – with overarching IC-wide policy that is locally interpreted and implemented to fit the specific needs of each IC element. When it comes to risk, creating an umbrella IC-wide framework will significantly improve the workforce’s ability to understand acceptable risks and tradeoffs, produce comprehensible and comparable risk determinations across the IC, and provide policymakers the ability to anticipate and mitigate failure and unintended escalation.

Critical Elements of a Risk Framework

A common IC AI risk framework should inform and help prioritize decisions from acquisition or development, to deployment, to performance in a consistent way across the IC. To start, the IC should create common AI risk management principles, like its existing principles of transparency and AI ethics, that include clear and consistent definitions, thresholds, and standards. These principles should drive a repeatable risk assessment process that each IC element can tailor to its individual needs, and should promote policy, governance, and technological approaches that are aligned to risk management.

The successful implementation of this risk framework requires a multi-disciplinary approach involving leaders from across the organization, experts from all relevant functional areas, and managers who can ensure vigilance in implementation. A whole-of-activity methodology that includes technologists, collectors, analysts, innovators, security officers, acquisition officers, lawyers and more, is critical to ensuring a full 360-degree understanding of the opportunities, issues, risks, and potential consequences associated with a particular action, and to enabling the best-informed decision.

Given the many players involved, each IC element must strengthen internal processes to manage the potential disconnects that can lead to unintended risks and to create a culture that instills in every officer a responsibility to proactively consider risk at each stage of the activity. Internal governance should include an interdisciplinary Risk Management Council (RMC) made up of senior leaders from across the organization. The RMC should establish clear and consistent thresholds for when a risk assessment is required, recommended, or not needed given that resource constraints likely will not allow all of the broad and diverse AI activities within organizations to be assessed. These thresholds should be consistent with the IC risk management principles so that as IC elements work together on projects across the community, officers have similar understandings and expectations.

The risk framework itself should provide a common taxonomy and process to:

  • Understand and identify potential failures, including the source, timeline, and range of effects.
  • Analyze failures and risks by identifying internal vulnerabilities or predisposing conditions that could increase the likelihood of adverse impact.
  • Evaluate the likelihood of failure, taking into consideration risks and vulnerabilities.
  • Assess the severity of the potential impact, to include potential harm to organizational operations, assets, individuals, other organizations, or the nation.
  • Consider whether the ultimate risk may be sufficiently mitigated or whether it should be transferred, avoided, or accepted.

AI-related risks may include, among other things, technology failure, biased data, adversarial attacks, supply chain compromises, human error, cost overruns, legal compliance challenges, or oversight issues.

An initial risk level is determined by considering the likelihood of a failure against the severity of the potential impact. For example, is there is a low, moderate, or high likelihood of supply chain compromise? Would such a compromise affect only one discrete system or are there system-wide implications? These calculations will result in an initial risk level. Then potential mitigation measures, such as additional policies, training, or security measures, are applied to lower the initial risk level to an adjusted risk level. For example, physically or logically segmenting an organization’s systems so that a compromise only touches one system would significantly decrease the risk level associated with that particular technology. The higher the likelihood of supply chain compromise, the lower the severity of its impact must be to offset the risk, and vice versa. Organizations should apply the Swiss Cheese Model of more than one preventative or mitigative action for a more effective layered defense. Organizations then must consider the adjusted risk level in relation to their tolerance for risk; how much risk (and potential consequence) is acceptable in pursuit of value? This requires defining the IC’s risk tolerance levels, within which IC elements may again define their own levels based upon their unique missions.

Understanding and considering the risk of action is an important step forward for the IC, but it is not the last step. Sometimes overlooked in risk assessment practices is the consideration of the risk of inaction. To fully evaluate potential options, decision-makers must consider whether the overall risk of doing something is outweighed by the risks of not doing it. If the IC does not pursue particular AI capabilities, what is the opportunity cost of that inaction? Any final determination about whether to take action must consider whether declining to act would cause greater risk of significant harm. While the answer will not always be yes, in the case of AI and emerging technology, it is a very realistic possibility.

And, finally, a risk framework only works if people know about it. Broad communication – about the existence of the framework, how to apply it, and expectations for doing so – is vital. We cannot hold people accountable for appropriately managing risk if we do not clearly and consistently communicate and help people use the structure and mechanisms for doing so.

Buy-in To Enhance Confidence

An IC-wide AI risk framework will help IC officers understand risks and determine when and how to take advantage of innovative emerging technologies like AI, increasing comfort with uncertainty and risk-taking in the pursuit of new capabilities. Such a risk framework will have even greater impact if it is accepted – explicitly or implicitly – by the IC’s congressional overseers. The final article in this series will delve more deeply into needed changes to further improve the crucial relationship between the IC and its congressional overseers. It will also provide a link to a full report that provides more detail on each aspect of the series, including a draft IC AI Risk Framework.

Although Congress is not formally bound by such a framework, given the significant accountability measures that often flow from these overseers, a meeting of the minds between the IC and its congressional overseers is critical. Indeed, these overseers should have awareness of and an informal ability to provide feedback into the framework as it is being developed. This level of transparency and partnership would lead to at least two important benefits: first, increased confidence in the framework by all; and second, better insight into IC decision-making for IC overseers.

Ultimately, such a mutual understanding would encourage exactly what the IC needs to truly take advantage of next-generation technology like AI: a culture of experimentation, innovation, and creativity that sees reasonable risk and failure as necessary steps to game-changing outcomes.

Read also AI and the IC: The Tangled Web of Budget and Acquisition

Read also Artificial Intelligence in the IC: Culture is Critical

Read also AI and the IC: The Challenges Ahead

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Apple has finally caved to users demanding the ‘right to repair’, allowing owners of iPhones, MacBooks, and other devices to tinker with their electronics at home instead of bringing them to notoriously expensive service centers.

Called Self Service Repair, the feature is set to launch “early next year” in the US before expanding to other countries. Some 200 parts are expected to be available, along with instructions on how to replace them.

Initially, the company will offer repairs for the iPhone 12 and 13, to be followed by Macs with M1 chips. Users will be able to replace the phones’ display, battery, and camera – some of the earliest parts to cease functioning – using original equipment from the company. While Apple encourages only “individual technicians with the knowledge and experience to repair electronic devices,” urging users to take their devices to a professional before cracking them open themselves, the move nevertheless represents a major step for a company that has long been resistant to allowing users to even swap out a battery.

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After rolling out repair instructions and parts for the iPhone 12 and 13, the company will gradually expand users’ abilities to fix their phones themselves without having to wait in line at the Apple Store. Users who attempt to make these repairs on their own will not void their warranty, according to TechCrunch, representing another major change for the tech giant.

Even this week, Apple was sealing off users’ ability to fix their own phones, barring users who replaced their own screens from being able to use Face ID recognition going forward. However, the various departments seem to be coordinating among themselves – users will receive a recycling credit for returning their used or broken part after completing the repair, and the company plans to sell “more than 200 individual parts and tools,” as well as repair manuals customers can peruse before attempting to repair their devices.

The decision to open up Apple’s “right to repair” might not have been entirely that of the company – the Federal Trade Commission wrote to the corporation earlier this year vowing to “address unlawful repair restrictions,” adding it would also “stand ready to work with legislators, either at the state or federal level, in order to ensure that consumers have choices when they need to repair products that they purchase and own.”

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President Joe Biden admitted during his address from the White House this week that, “The scenes we’re seeing in Afghanistan, they’re gut-wrenching, particularly for our veterans, our diplomats, humanitarian workers, for anyone who has spent time on the ground working to support the Afghan people.”

Yet the voices of the veteran community aren’t always heard in mainstream media, which tends to prioritize finger pointing and political bickering instead of focusing on the impact of such events on the people who served there, or the people who lost loved ones there. The depression and rage that flowed through the veteran community – as the US flag came down from the Embassy in Kabul, and as the U.S. failed to secure even a safe route out of the country for its own people, much less the Afghans who have supported the US-led effort there for the past 20 years –  was swift and devastating to many in the veteran community, who often don’t engage with media, but turn to each other for support via chatrooms.

A statement released by former President George Bush and former First Lady Laura Bush read, “Many of you deal with wounds of war, both visible and invisible. And some of your brothers and sisters in arms made the ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror. Each day, we have been humbled by your commitment and your courage. You took out a brutal enemy and denied Al Qaeda a safe haven while building schools, sending supplies, and providing medical care. You kept America safe from further terror attacks, provided two decades of security and opportunity for millions, and made America proud. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts and will always honor your contributions.”  

The Cipher Brief reached out to two veteran leaders, Matthew Griffin and Scott Chapman, who wrote a fictitious letter they titled ‘Writing in Taliban’ as a way to share their outrage over recent events and how they believe – based on their unique on-the-ground experience – the Taliban will communicate this ‘victory’ to their followers.


“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

― Sun Tzu, The Art of War 


Matthew ‘Griff’ Griffin, Former Army Ranger

 Matthew “Griff” Griffin is a former Special Operations Army Ranger and a West Point Graduate.  He served four combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq with the 2nd Ranger Battalion. Griff departed the military in 2006 and co-founded Combat Flip Flops; manufacturing fashion and lifestyle products in war zones, with profits supporting girl’s education, land mine clearance, and veteran’s charities.

Scott Chapman, Former Army Ranger

Scott Chapman served in 2nd Battalion 75th Ranger Regiment from 2001-2005.  He deployed to Iraq during the 2003 invasion and to Afghanistan 4 times.  After the military, Scott worked as a contractor providing security support to the Intelligence community where he deployed 17 times mostly at Forward Operating Bases (FOB) providing security support for Intelligence personnel and operations.  Scott’s final duty rotation was at the US Embassy Annex in Kabul where he worked as a mentor for Local Guard Forces. 

Author’s Note:  We’ve spent the past week trying to find a way to communicate our thoughts to the American people in a manner that would intentionally evoke some of the anger, rage, action, and understanding that we feel.  Writing in the voice of a Taliban felt right. If reading our letter from the Taliban makes you angry, cry, or contemplative–then our goal is achieved.  Our hope is that it inspires you to take action by reaching out to your elected officials.  They’ve been repeating the same failed playbook since World War II with your sons, daughters, and tax dollars.  If you want this to keep happening, do nothing.  If you don’t, then do something.  If we all do a little, together we do a lot.

‘Written in Taliban’

OPINION/PERSPECTIVE — The first time I saw you was in the Khyber Pass.  You came with your technology, elite fighters fueled by revenge, and the hubris to believe you could disprove history.

This was a war that you didn’t have the stomach to fight.  But I’m glad you tried.

We bled you the same way we bled the Soviets in our Holy Land.  We bled you the same way the Vietnamese bled you in their homeland.  We did it patiently and deliberately.

Patience.  Something Westerners never learn.

Our history is millennial.  We don’t yearn for an early victory when the Infidel ravages our Holy Land.  Our victory is celebrated decades from now.  We’ve endured, then ravaged every standing military that crossed our borders.   Why?  How?  We’re patient.

In 30 days, we’ll be stronger, richer, and have control over precious natural resources that you need for your pathetic life dictated by comfort.  We will have women, riches, land, guns, and ownership of one of the greatest chapters in military history.

You lose.

If you want to try again, we welcome the challenge.  You will fail regardless of how much money you burn in our deserts. For pity, here is free advice that may contribute to your future success; should you ever decide to invade again.

You recruit your warriors and supporters from a drug addicted, distracted, disillusioned population that’s obsessed with comfort and entertainment.  A population obsessed with altering their mundane reality.  Alcohol, marijuana, pills, and our new favorite — Tide Pods.  Every time your doctors prescribe opiate painkillers, you line our coffers with gold.  Your population’s thirst for our pristine heroin has never been more lucrative for our warrior tribes.   We will keep feeding you poison for as long as you keep your hands out.

If your population wasn’t so spineless, undisciplined, and self-loathing, then you might be able to compile a raiding party with enough tenacity to outthink ours.  Our fighters are born into war.  Raised in it.  It’s a way of life that evades your “first world” nations. They live a life of such immense misery and pain that they’re willing to fight barefoot in the snow for the opportunity to martyr themselves. They yearn for the opportunity to die.  When they do have the blessed opportunity to sacrifice themselves, they sit above Mohammed at the right hand of God.  Blessed in Allah for eternity

What honors do your fighters receive?  Their empty sacrifice is remembered in the form of a “three-day weekend.”  The majority of your population uses this sacred time to get drunk and grow more fat as a way to celebrate their fallen warriors.  Sadly, we pay tribute to their death more honorably.

The colored pieces of cloth you pin on their chests are similar to the jewelry worn by our women.  What good are accolades and vanity if you don’t have the stomach to endure a fight?   We don’t offer the burden of healthcare to our fighters as they often want to die for Allah.  Your fighters fight to live.  Their inability to reconcile the inevitable outcome of our patience leads them to kill themselves.  Your medications, counselors and non-profits will never undo the pain and suffering you’ve forced them to endure.  It will never remove the pain we’ve caused your broken nation.  You are your own worst enemy.

We will give your fighters credit.  Some are creative, tenacious, and fierce. They outgun us in every way possible.  But again, we simply wait them out.  Allah is patient.  You cycle them through our Holy Lands every 3 to 12 months for their combat rotations.  After their tour is complete, they return to the comfort of their warm beds and endless entertainment.  If you left them here, in our Holy Land, with no way out but to win, then you might of have had a chance of success.  The longer you poisoned our Holy Land with your presence, your “rules of engagement” only strengthened our position. There is only one rule in war – that is to win.

Your commanders made you fight with your hands tied behind your back. Your rules also confused our fighters too.  “We’re clearly the enemy; why are they letting us go?”  Thank you for your compassion as it allowed our fighters to kill more Infidels.  We began to feel as if your commanders were on our side.  We’re thankful your most vicious dogs were never allowed off their leash.

Your showcase Generals make us laugh.  You spend millions of dollars flying them around our country, inventing new ways to win while ignoring the guidance of our most capable foes.  Your Generals make decisions to minimize risk to their fragile reputation with the ultimate goal of securing a lucrative retirement–jobs with suppliers that fuel your losing force. A self-serving circle that’s built on the backs of your youngest and most naive fighters.

Your retired Generals “earn” tens of thousands of dollars talking to your political, industrial, and financial leaders about “teams, winning, and discipline.”  It’s a mockery of the war they refused to fight.  It’s a mockery of the Infidel warriors who died in our lands. We urge you to continue following their vacuous personalities so we can further watch your once great nation collapse.

Your statesman and elected officials are spineless, narcissistic, and more cowardly than your Generals.  They crave power over you above all else.  They come to our country, hide behind blast walls, and only heed the word of the indigenous leader they put in power.   I believe your soldiers call this a “self-licking ice cream cone.”

They’ve burned billions of dollars in a wasted effort to bring clean water, electricity, business, education, agriculture, and exports to a region that didn’t ask for it.  You should have saved yourself the effort and simply given the money directly to us.  Don’t worry; your diplomatic friends gave us plenty of your American tax dollars.  If you want to give it another shot with your “soft power,” send those with real experience, not fancy degrees and silver tongues.

Over the next few months, we will make the world understand that you failed worse than any fighting force that’s ever invaded our lands.  Today we celebrate victory.

As you evacuate your embassy, our fighters will be standing in the shade.  Our RPG marksmen will be patient.  We thank you for the parting gifts.  You’ll find surface-to-air missiles staged in the back of Toyota pickup trucks that you purchased for us.  We saw what Extortion 17 did to your nation and the morale of your fighting force.  Do your citizens even remember that victory? We’ll be repeating and improving upon our victory while your citizens and sympathizers evacuate in disgrace.  Every one of your foes around the world will know exactly how to break you. You are welcome to fly your empty drones, target our cell phones, and send your spies.  But they, too, will ultimately fail.  We’ll use their failures to show the world that you’re not all-powerful.  You’re a false front–an empty shell. You lie, cheat, steal, and are easily defeated because you lack the spine to fight.  This is your history now.  We’re grateful Allah gave us the opportunity to show the world how to defeat the Infidels.

We look forward to seeing you again across the battlefield.

Praise be to God,

The Taliban


The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of veteran views on this issue.  Stay tuned for more and read different informed, national security perspectives in The Cipher Brief

 

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Some voters in Germany’s capital, Berlin, may have to re-cast their ballots after the country’s federal election czar filed an official complaint over irregularities in a parliamentary vote held two months ago.

The election – which saw Berliners decide the makeup of the German parliament, the Bundestag, as well as select city representatives – was marred by irregularities at numerous polling stations, according to the official, Georg Thiel. 

Among the most common problems were ballot shortages and long lines, with waiting times of up to two hours. In some cases, voters were also seen casting their ballots past a 6pm cutoff – the time when all polling stations were supposed to have closed. Thiel, who was tasked with overseeing elections at federal level, saw all of the above as reason enough to raise an objection in the German capital, local media reported on Friday.

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Thiel identified six Berlin constituencies where irregularities were allegedly rampant, potentially setting the stage for a re-do election in the city.  

It is now up to a special Bundestag committee to examine Thiel’s complaint and see if the reported violations ran afoul of German law or electoral procedures. For the vote to be repeated, however, at least one of those violations would have to be deemed serious enough to have affected the distribution of seats in the Bundestag.

The September 26 election saw outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservatives take a historic beating, with the Social Democrats coming out on top. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been engaged in coalition talks with the Greens and the Free Democratic Party ever since, with the trio expected to announce a preliminary deal as early as next week.

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An adviser to the EU’s top court has claimed that citizens’ information in Germany is being illegally harvested, after telecom companies challenged bulk data collection.

The German data retention law was criticized on Thursday by an adviser to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), who stated that general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data is only allowed in exceptional cases, such as a threat to national security.

According to the adviser, bulk collection of data generates a ‘serious risk’ of leaks or improper access. It also entails a ‘serious interference’ with citizens’ fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal data.

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This comes after two companies, SpaceNet and Telekom Deutschland, challenged the obligation to store their customers’ telecommunications traffic data in 2016. The Administrative Court of Cologne ruled that the two companies were not obliged to retain data because such an obligation violated Union law. Germany then appealed to the Federal Administrative Court, who asked the CJEU about the compatibility of the data retention obligation.

The CJEU has often stated that indiscriminate mass surveillance does not fit within the general principles of EU law. Over a year ago it saw a similar case involving legal challenges around national bulk data collection under UK and French law. The court then ruled that only limited data collection and temporary retention were allowed. France seeks to bypass the CJEU on data retention and has asked the country’s highest administrative court (the Council of State) not to follow the EU ruling. France is waiting for the conclusion of the procedure launched by the Council of State before “assessing to what extent” national law should be changed. 

Despite recent EU court attempts to curb surveillance powers, leaked papers from June 2021 show that the national governments of the Netherlands, France, Spain, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Estonia are pushing for a new pan-EU data retention law. They claim that data retention is essential for safeguarding public security and ensuring effective criminal investigations.

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This piece by General Joseph Votel (Ret.) and Lt. Gen. Michael K. Nagata (Ret.) and was first published by our friends at the Middle East Institute.


Lt. Gen. (ret.) Michael K. Nagata is a distinguished senior fellow on national security at MEI. He retired from the U.S. Army in 2019 after 38 years of active duty, with 34 years in US Special Operations. His final position was director of strategy for the National Counterterrorism Center from 2016 to 2019.

Gen. (ret.) Joseph L. Votel is a distinguished senior fellow on national security at MEI. He retired as a four-star general in the U.S. Army after a nearly 40-year career, during which he held a variety of commands in positions of leadership, including most recently as commander of CENTCOM from March 2016 to March 2019. 


OPINION – The United States and Pakistan have had a complex and often disappointing “love-hate” relationship since 1947 — one severely tested during the 20-year U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan. We believe the time has come for serious policy consideration of whether and how both nations can achieve a more strategically beneficial and sustainable post-intervention relationship between the American and Pakistani governments and their populations.

As we consider a new policy, the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan after two decades of leading the international coalition is almost complete. Early indications are that Afghanistan is increasingly likely to descend into significant instability and possibly serious fracture, which will have unwelcome consequences for the Afghan people and all of Afghanistan’s neighbors. It is already clear that international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State-Khorasan Province will continue to enjoy and probably grow their safe havens.

Whatever U.S. strategic concerns may be about the future of Afghanistan, the course and direction of Pakistan’s strategic choices in coming years will also matter to the United States. There are a variety of reasons for this.

First, Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state. Decades of investments in nuclear weapons by Pakistan and India, compounded by unrelenting and mutual historical, religious, cultural, and political antagonism between them, make this one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints.

Second, all of the countries Pakistan borders are consequential for the U.S. Pakistan also has significant religious, cultural, and economic ties to other Muslim states such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In an era of “great power competition,” while Pakistan may not be one of the principal players, its network of relationships can be of strategic benefit to any of the great powers now involved, including the U.S. and China.

Third, despite its significant political and economic difficulties, Pakistan has a growing technology sector. Its youthful population and worldwide diaspora of Pakistani doctors, scientists, academics, and other professionals have become an increasingly important part of the global community.


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As long-time veterans of South Asia, both of us understand the sources of “weariness and wariness” that U.S. policymakers, in both Democratic and Republican administrations, often associate with strategic discussions of Pakistan. We have both seen the U.S. government’s reluctance toward undertaking any kind of strategic interaction or rapprochement with Pakistan because of previous disappointments or perceived betrayals. Understanding the enormous complexities of Pakistan’s relationships, influence, and strategic choices in the South Asia milieu can be intellectually challenging and draining.

Yet, we have both concluded that the only thing harder than establishing a functional and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan is living without one. Given unstable borders, a nuclear standoff with India, the continued presence of terrorist organizations, and the high potential for all of this to further disrupt our interests, there is no better alternative.

Among those areas that we believe worth exploring with the Pakistanis are these:

First, the possibility of planning, along with other like-minded international actors (both state and non-state), to manage the consequences of significant political instability and human suffering emerging from Afghanistan, including the possibility of substantial refugee flight into Pakistan. Indeed, the Pakistanis have long and miserable memories of the surge of Afghan refugees after the Kabul government collapsed in the 1990s and have consistently expressed deep concerns about a possible repeat resulting from the U.S. withdrawal now nearing its completion.

Second, the possibility of counterterrorism cooperation against any terrorist threat that emerges from Afghanistan and prevents it from sowing further instability across the region. We do not consider it likely that Pakistan will allow any positioning of U.S. intelligence or counterterrorism elements within its borders. Still, there may be other ways (e.g., working groups, forums, or exchanges) to foster better cooperation if a threat emerges from Afghanistan that is of concern to our mutual interests.

Third, the possibility of enlisting Pakistan cooperation, and that of India, toward some type of partial de-escalation of tensions along their common border and, with it, even a slight amelioration of the nuclear weapons threat. It is instructive to recall that, before 9/11, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee initiated a dialogue about the de-escalation of tensions that included the highly emotional issue of Kashmir. However, talks broke down without significant agreement. While we recognize this is an extraordinarily complex and fraught issue for the U.S. to embrace, given all of its other strategic challenges, the specter of a potential nuclear conflict in South Asia should at a minimum prompt us to ask ourselves, “why not at least try?” Indeed, U.S. antagonists such as China would probably take a dim view of such efforts, and we believe that might be a reason for doing so rather than a reason to flinch from it.


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We have long heard U.S. policy and operational practitioners cite phrases such as “never underestimate the Pakistanis’ ability to disappoint us.” But, unfortunately, most American policymakers do not understand how often we have heard the Pakistanis say the same thing about Americans. Thus, both sides have longstanding “neuralgias” about the other. As we end our Afghan campaign, now is the time to move beyond our neuralgias and carefully weigh the strategic costs of whether trying to somehow partner with Pakistan is more, or less, than the cost of failing to do so. We believe, in the long run, it is likely to be less costly.

The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors.

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Truckers and other motorists have been trapped in a four-mile-long traffic jam on the outskirts of the Dutch city of Rotterdam amid a protest against the government’s Covid measures.

According to local media, as many as 200 activists blocked the gates of a major port in the city’s harbor on Thursday. For several hours, they prevented any vehicles from driving in and out of the cargo hub, which, in turn, led to massive traffic congestion on the highway leading to the port. Police engaged in negotiations with the protesters, who eventually relented and left the site later in the evening.

The group behind the protest action is reportedly Dockers United, who are staunchly opposed to government Covid policies. The organization’s biggest concern is that authorities could soon make it mandatory for employees to have a vaccination or recovery certificate to enter the workplace, which, as the group argues, would be tantamount to excluding people from society on an “unconstitutional basis.” They are also generally unhappy with the curbs introduced by the Dutch government, with ‘Don’t normalize what’s not normal’ being a translation of one of their slogans.

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Riot police officers face protesters in the Hague on November 12, 2021, as the PM announced new Covid-19 restrictions © Jeroen Jumelet / ANP / AFP
WATCH: Protesters, police clash after new Covid restrictions announced in the Netherlands

In fact, the Dutch government did announce earlier this month that it was working on introducing a ‘corona pass’ for the workplace, though it isn’t clear yet when this measure will be rolled out and how strict it will be.

Meanwhile, on Friday the EU country logged its highest-ever number of new Covid cases within 24 hours, with that figure reaching 23,591. Medics say they are working at capacity.

Amid the spike, the Dutch prime minister imposed a partial lockdown last Saturday, which requires bars, restaurants, cafes and supermarkets to close at 8pm, while shops selling non-essential goods are to shut by 6pm. Public gatherings are banned altogether.

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Cipher Brief Expert Tim Willasey-Wilsey is a Visiting Professor at King’s College, London and a former senior British diplomat. From 1996 to 1999 he was senior advisor to the British government on overseas counterterrorism.  This piece was first published by RUSI in London.  The views do not represent those of RUSI.


Analysis of openly available sources indicates that a British report shared with the US in December 1998 described an early stage of the 9/11 plot.


EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Two extracts from Presidential Daily Briefs (PDB) are given some prominence in the 9/11 Commission report into the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. One is from a PDB delivered to President Bill Clinton on 4 December 1998, and the other is from a PDB given to President George W Bush on 6 August 2001. Both are presented inside a textbox and both contain intelligence ‘from a friendly government’ which provided the first and only significant suggestion that Al-Qa’ida (AQ) planned to hijack aircraft in the US.

Eight months after the attacks, under Congressional pressure, the Bush administration was obliged to reveal some details of the PDBs, and on 17 May 2002 the New York Times disclosed that ‘the report provided to the president on Aug. 6, which warned him that Mr. bin Laden’s followers might hijack airplanes, was based on 1998 intelligence data drawn from a single British source, government officials said today’. The British government was obliged to acknowledge that the intelligence came from British sources. The Guardian reported on 18 May that ‘The memo received by Bush on 6 August contained unconfirmed information passed on by British intelligence in 1998’. The Independent ran much the same story with additional detail.

Both PDBs quoted from one British report from December 1998. The key question is whether this report, with its significant deviations from what actually happened on the day, actually referred to the 9/11 operation. Subsequently published evidence points compellingly to this indeed being an early version of the 9/11 plan.

The heavily redacted British contribution was shown on pages 127 and 128 of the 9/11 Commission’s report. It reads:

‘On Friday December 4 1998 the CIA included an article in the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) describing intelligence received from a friendly government about a hijacking in the United States.

‘SUBJECT. Bin Laden preparing to hijack US aircraft. Reporting [passage redacted] suggests bin Laden and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Sheikh Omar Abdal Rahman,  Ramzi Yousef and Muhammad Sadiq Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gamaat Al-Islamiya (GI) saying that “as of late October the GI had completed planning for an operation in the US on behalf of bin Laden but that the operation was on hold. A senior bin Laden operative from Saudi Arabia was to visit GI counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options – perhaps including an aircraft hijacking. GI leader Islambouli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during “the next couple of weeks” to free Abdal Rahman and the other prisoners according to what may be another source. The same source late last month said that bin Laden might implement plans to hijack aircraft before the beginning of Ramadan on 20 December and that two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport.’


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In May 2002 the US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice issued a statement observing (correctly) that the report had mentioned ‘hijacking in the traditional sense’ with no indication that aircraft would be used as weapons of mass destruction. Her testimony to the 9/11 Commission made broadly the same point.

Indeed, even in late 1998, there was a profusion of threat reports of which the aviation strand was just one. The MI5 official history comments aptly that the Service was puzzled as to why there were so many more reports of threats than actual attacks: ‘Even the most reliably sourced intelligence received on this question usually consists of a snapshot of a proposed plan being discussed. Most of the reporting does not make clear how far advanced the plan is’ (Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, pp. 802–806). What MI5 did not realise at the time was that AQ operations could take up to three years from inception to execution.

Steve Coll writes that ‘Within the morass of intelligence lay ominous patterns. One was an interest by bin Laden’s operatives in the use of aircraft … yet at the counter terrorism security group meetings and at the CIA’s counter terrorist centre there was no special emphasis placed on bin Laden’s threat to civil aviation or on the several exposed plots where his followers had considered turning hijacked airplanes into cruise missiles’ (Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 419–420).

Although the December 1998 report appears fragmentary, there were a number of aspects of particular interest. The first was the name Ramzi Yousef. Yousef had studied electrical engineering at Swansea Institute from 1986 to 1990 before exploding a massive bomb under the World Trade Centre in February 1993 and then planning the Bojinka Plot against airliners in the Philippines in 1994. Yousef had been arrested in Islamabad in February 1995 and sent to the US, where he was tried and imprisoned for life. He was an energetic and imaginative terrorist, and his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was also known to move in terrorist circles.

The aviation link must have struck a chord, too. The British were also interested in Hussain Kherchtou, who had been in Kenya at the time of the Embassy bombings and was himself a pilot. He later provided a debrief to the FBI. His story and his courtship by the British came into the public domain because of a subsequent US court case and a talkative FBI officer.

The Egyptian angle also would have provoked little surprise. On 19 November 1995 Egyptian terrorists had blown up the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, killing 13 – only yards from the British High Commission compound with its exposed staff housing and kindergarten. The British had a miraculous escape that day.

The concern for the release of Sheikh Abdal Rahman, ‘the Blind Sheikh’, was consistent with the widespread devotion which the preacher inspired among Islamist radicals and particularly Egyptians. His imprisonment in New York for his part in Yousef’s attack on the World Trade Centre had caused significant distress among his many adherents, who all wanted his release.

The idea that AQ would strike the US had first surfaced in 1997 and felt like the logical next step. Only a month beforehand (in November 1998), AQ had attacked two US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people including 12 US citizens. These operations had served as a wake-up call for those who thought the AQ threat was being exaggerated, and some who even conceived of Osama bin Laden himself as a benign figure who had somehow got out of his depth.

There were also some puzzling elements in the report. The first was the rather outdated idea of hijacking an aircraft to demand the release of the Blind Sheikh. It felt more in tune with Palestinian terrorist methods of the 1970s, and it was already known that Ramzi Yousef had developed the idea of exploding full airliners in flight.

The involvement of Gama’at Islamiya (GI) seemed odd. Bin Laden was known to be close to Ayman Al-Zawahiri of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), with whom GI were usually at daggers drawn. At the time GI were conceived of more as domestic Egyptian terrorists compared to the internationalist EIJ. Indeed, GI’s most recent operation had been the Luxor Massacre of November 1997, which killed 56 foreign tourists.


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The name Islambouli carried great resonance. This was Mohammed Shawqi Islambouli, who had tried to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995. His brother Khalid had been one of the assassins of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981 and had been tried and executed in Cairo. However, although Mohammed was thought to be in Afghanistan, he was not then known to be close to bin Laden, let alone Al-Zawahiri.

The dates made little sense. On the one hand an attack seemed imminent, but on the other hand it was ‘on hold’. But such is the nature of counterterrorist reporting: small fragments of a much bigger jigsaw.

Nonetheless, the report was taken very seriously on its receipt in the US. President Bill Clinton’s counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke summoned his Counterterrorism Security Group. ‘To address the hijacking warning, the group agreed that New York airports should go to maximum security starting that weekend. They agreed to boost security at other East coast airports. The CIA agreed to distribute versions of the report to the FBI and FAA to pass to the New York Police Department and the airlines. The FAA issued a security directive on December 8, with specific requirements for more intensive air carrier screening of passengers and more oversight of the screening process, at all three New York City area airports.’

Of course, when 9/11 happened nearly three years later, there were two very significant differences. Although aircraft were indeed hijacked, they were used as missiles rather than as bargaining chips, and the terrorists were mainly Saudi and not Egyptian. So what happened between December 1998 and September 2001 which could explain these changes?

The 9/11 Commission report (drawing on material from the interrogation of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed) provides a fascinating section on AQ’s development of aviation methodology. Even before bin Laden had left Sudan in mid-1996, he had allegedly discussed the use of aircraft with Mohammed Atef: ‘(1) they rejected hijackings aimed at gaining the release of imprisoned comrades as too complex, because al Qaeda had no friendly countries in which to land a plane and then negotiate; (2) they considered the bombing of commercial flights in midair, as carried out against Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, a promising means to inflict massive casualties; and (3) they did not yet consider using hijacked aircraft as weapons against other targets.’

So, why was the idea of a traditional hijacking still being discussed as late as December 1998? The answer must lie in the Egyptian jihadists’ determination to win the release of the Blind Sheikh. Mustafa Hamid, a journalist who was with bin Laden in Afghanistan, provides illuminating insight into the wrangling between EIJ and GI in Afghanistan. Hamid documents the tortuous process by which GI, with some reluctance, formed a union (‘The World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders’) with AQ, EIJ and others, but recounts how GI insisted on secrecy about their involvement. Hamid also describes GI’s determination to obtain the Blind Sheikh’s release and the involvement of one of their operatives in the African Embassy bombings (Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan, p. 241 and pp. 263–266). So GI was indeed part of bin Laden’s group in Afghanistan and was involved in operations at the time of the December 1998 report.

However, bin Laden became increasingly irritated by the endless squabbling among the two Egyptian groups. Lawrence Wright, drawing upon a variety of sources, chronicles the disastrous attack on Luxor, which had the effect of alienating the Egyptian population from both groups. When on 23 February 1998 bin Laden’s second fatwa announcing the ‘World Islamic Front’ was published in an Arabic newspaper in London, GI were appalled, and some members tried to have Rahman pronounced emir instead of bin Laden. No wonder that Wright concludes that ‘bin Laden had had enough of the in-fighting between the Egyptian factions. He told both groups that their operations in Egypt were ineffectual and too expensive and that it was time for them to turn their guns on the United States and Israel’ (Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 290–296). This may explain why the December 1998 report mentions the operation being ‘on hold’. Between December and the spring of 1999, the GI team and Islambouli must have been stood down.

According to the 9/11 Commission report, in March or April 1999, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) – who had hitherto allegedly been on the fringes of AQ – was summoned to Kandahar, where he discussed the aircraft plan with bin Laden and Mohammed Atef. Four operatives were chosen to begin work on the US project. However, ‘travel issues … played a part in al Qaeda’s operational planning from the very start. During the spring and summer of 1999, KSM realized that Khallad and Abu Bara, both of whom were Yemenis, would not be able to obtain US visas as easily as Saudi operatives like Mihdhar and Hazmi’. And so, the 9/11 plot developed with 15 of the 19 terrorists being Saudi nationals. Only Mohammed Atta was Egyptian.

KSM’s key involvement in the 9/11 plot makes it evident that there could not have been a second GI plot running in parallel, because KSM and Islambouli were close associates. Robert Baer and the 9/11 Commission report agree that KSM and Islambouli were working together in Qatar in the mid-1990s. For KSM it must have been difficult to abandon the rescue of his nephew, but he would have known that a traditional hostage release operation had none of the ambition or scale of bin Laden’s new thinking.

On 6 August 2001, only five weeks before the attacks, the December 1998 report featured once again in the PDB given to George W Bush at Crawford, Texas, entitled ‘Bin Laden determined to strike in US’. It began: ‘Clandestine foreign government and media reports indicate bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US’, and concluded: ‘We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting such as that from a [redacted] Service in 1998 saying that bin Laden wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “blind Sheikh” Omar Abdal Rahman and other US-held extremists … Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.’

The PDB of 6 August caused some discomfort to the Bush administration and led to a National Security Archive page devoted to that one PDB (of which the December 1998 British report was just one constituent part).

The CIA Director George Tenet, who had been a tireless pursuer of the AQ threat before 9/11 and a regular correspondent with and visitor to London, regretted that more had not been done ‘to protect the United States against the threat. To cite two obvious and tragic failures, only after 9/11 were cockpit doors hardened and passengers forbidden from carrying box-cutters aboard US commercial airliners’ (George Tenet, At the Centre of the Storm, p. 205).

The British report of December 1998 was fragmentary, and while it was certainly ‘sensational’, it was not half as sensational as the actual events of that unforgettable and tragic day.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the authors, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

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Controversial agriculture laws that saw farmers across India protesting for over a year are going to be rolled back, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has unexpectedly announced.

“I want to tell the country that we have decided to repeal the three farm laws,” Modi said in a televised address on Friday, which local media described as “stunning.”

The Indian parliament will complete the constitutional process of repealing the agricultural legislation in late November, he added.

However, the PM again defended the divisive legislation, saying that the reform of the sector, which accounts for some 15% of India’s $2.7 trillion economy, was actually aimed at supporting the country’s small farmers.

Whatever I did was for farmers. What I am doing is for the country.

“Maybe something was lacking in our efforts, which is why we couldn’t convince some farmers about the laws,” Modi acknowledged.

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Farmers block railway tracks as part of protests against farm laws during nationwide protests, in Sonipat, northern state of Haryana, India, September 27, 2021. © Reuters / Anushree Fadnavi
Indian farmers return to hold nationwide protests against last year’s agriculture laws

The laws, which were introduced last September, allowed farmers to sell their crops outside of the government-regulated wholesale markets, in which they were guaranteed a minimum price.

The government argued that it would see them earning more, but growers feared that that move would, on the contrary, cause a drop in prices and make them hostages to large corporations.

Thousands of farmers joined the protests against what they called “black laws,” and some rallies turned violent. A year later, many demonstrators remain camped along roads outside the capital New Delhi.

And the farmers aren’t planning on going home just yet, with one of their leaders saying on Twitter: “We will wait for parliament to repeal the laws.”

Modi’s concession to the protesters may have been unexpected, but it comes several months ahead of elections in India’s most populous state of Uttar Pradesh, as well as two other northern states with large rural populations.

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