Just three days after restrictions were announced for unvaccinated Austrians, a provincial governor is pressing for a nationwide lockdown of all residents as Covid-19 infections continue to hit record highs.

“If no national lockdown is ordered tomorrow, there will definitely have to be a lockdown of several weeks in Upper Austria, together with our neighboring province Salzburg as of next week,” Upper Austria Governor Thomas Stelzer told lawmakers on Thursday.

That will mean at least two of Austria’s nine provinces will be in full lockdown mode just days after the nation created a two-tier society by locking down approximately two million unvaccinated Austrians.

“We must raise the vaccination rate. It is shamefully low,” Chancellor Alexander Schallenberg said on Sunday, announcing that unvaccinated residents would only be allowed to leave their homes for “essential” purposes, such as to buy groceries or go to a doctor’s office.

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FILE PHOTO: Health care workers exchange a fast PCR test sample in a mobile laboratory truck, amid the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, in Soelden, Austria, October 15, 2020. REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger
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Police are now doing random checks for proof of vaccination on Austrian streets. Those unvaccinated residents who are found to be in violation of the lockdown order face steep fines of up to €500. Those who refuse to go through a vaccination status check will have to pay about three times as much.

Stelzer and other Austrian governors are scheduled to meet with Schallenberg and Health Minister Wolfgang Mueckstein on Friday, when a full lockdown will likely be considered.

New Covid-19 cases in the country passed the 15,000 mark for the first time on Thursday, far surpassing 2020’s daily high of 9,586, set when no vaccines were available. Upper Austria and Salzburg have been hit the hardest, putting hospitals at risk of bed shortages. With some 66% of its population fully vaccinated, Austria lags behind other Western European countries in terms of the Covid-19 vaccination rate.

While Austria is the first to impose a lockdown on the unvaccinated, other EU countries – including Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Greece – have imposed increasingly tight restrictions on people who haven’t accepted a Covid vaccine.

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Those making and knowingly using fake vaccination certificates in Germany could soon face up to five years behind bars, as the country’s likely future coalition government is looking to tighten the screws.

Coming under the same category are also fake test results and Covid recovery certificates, with similar penalties for the counterfeiters and the holders. Everything envisaged in the new guidelines was drafted by the Social Democrats, along with the Free Democratic and Green Parties. The three are currently in coalition talks and expected to form a new government as early as next week.

The German Parliament will decide on the regulations this Thursday, though a draft has already been seen by the media outlet DPA.

According to German media, the manufacturing and sale of fake certificates has become a booming black-market industry in the country. In just one such case reported by Der Spiegel in late October, a counterfeiter working at a pharmacy in Munich and her accomplice had churned out more than 500 fake digital certificates in the span of one month, raking in €350 for each one sold.

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Felix Gottwald has spoken out as police patrol the streets of Austria to check people are vaccinated © Lisi Niesner / Reuters | © Instagram / felixgottwaldofficial
‘I am deeply ashamed of our country’: Austria’s greatest Olympian quits political role as lockdown for unvaccinated comes in

Meanwhile, Berlin authorities are planning to further ramp up restrictions in the city, where, starting Monday, having either a vaccination or recovery certificate is a must to enter restaurants, cinemas, theaters, museums, galleries, swimming pools, gyms, as well as hairdressers and beauty salons. On Tuesday, Berlin Mayor Michael Müller confirmed that authorities want to “have an additional instrument” to contain the spread of the virus. However, he declined to elaborate on what the new measures will be. Local media speculate that starting next week, in addition to the requirement to have a vaccination or recovery certificate to enter public places, people inside the venues will also need to practice social distancing and wear a mask, or have a recent negative test result.

This comes after Covid-19 numbers in Berlin hit an all-time high last Thursday, with 2,874 new cases reported that day.

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UK Home Secretary Priti Patel has acted to proscribe the Palestinian group Hamas “in its entirety,” stating that it has significant capacity to carry out terrorist acts and has facilities to train attackers.

In a tweet on Friday, Patel stated that she had banned the Palestinian group Hamas and designated it a terrorist organization, as she reiterated the British government’s commitment to “tackling extremism and terrorism wherever it occurs.”

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“Hamas has significant terrorist capability, including access to extensive and sophisticated weaponry, as well as terrorist training facilities,” she wrote.  

The home secretary’s tweet came during her visit to Washington and followed speculation on Friday morning that she was soon to outlaw the group.

Pre-empting Patel’s announcement, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett welcomed Britain’s intention” on Twitter.

“Hamas is a radical Islamic group that targets innocent Israelis & seeks Israel’s destruction. I welcome the UK’s intention to declare Hamas a terrorist organization in its entirety – because that’s exactly what it is,” Bennett wrote, thanking the leadership of Prime Minister Boris Johnson.  

Yair Lapid, Israel’s foreign minister, also hailed the expected move against Hamas, saying it was part of strengthening ties with Britain.” 

Until now, only Hamas’ military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, had been outlawed by the British government. The EU and the US have already proscribed all of Hamas.

Hamas political official Sami Abu Zuhri rejected Britain’s move, claiming it showed absolute bias toward the Israeli occupation and is a submission to Israeli blackmail and dictations.” 

In a separate statement, the group claimed it had a right to resist occupation by all available means, “including armed resistance.”

Hamas seized total control of Gaza in 2007, on the back of an election victory in 2006.

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Covid-19 variants keep emerging in different parts of the world, causing experts to ask how long the pandemic will last, and how effective the current methods of protection really are.

Since the pandemic started in 2019, people have referred to the disease which has paralyzed the world simply as ‘coronavirus’. Now, in 2021, when we talk about it, we mean not just the original variant, but also its numerous mutations. 

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In May, the WHO decided to label the key variants with Greek letters. Since then, the Delta variant has been proclaimed the predominant strain across the world, and now we have titles that look like codes to detail the differences between variants. Last month, the UK was put on high alert over a fast-spreading Delta AY.4.2 variant. This week, Norway reported finding one more version of the Delta strain – AY. 63. The country’s experts suggest it’s not more dangerous than the Delta mutation itself. Meanwhile, another Covid variant, discovered in France (B.1.640), brought the researchers an unpleasant surprise: they said they’d never seen mutations like it. 

Professor David Dockrell, from the Center for Inflammation Research of the University of Edinburgh, described to RT the reasons for the constant mutation of the coronavirus. “The areas in the virus that are most likely to change are those that come into contact with what we call ‘selective pressures’ – or factors that make them need to change,” he explains. “So, a version of the virus which mutates and changes to give it a selective advantage to escape from the immune system is more likely to prosper and become a dominant strain.” 

That’s how it works: The part of the virus many of the immune responses (or antibodies, T-cells etc.) are responding to is called the spike protein (or the S-protein). So, the virus tries to change it in order to survive. 

“We know that a variety of different viruses are able to mutate and change when exposed to the selective pressure of the immune system, whether it would be the human immune system or other species in which these viruses have evolved,” Prof. Dockrell says. “And of course, we’ve seen it most clearly with HIV, which is particularly good at changing and evolving. It does something called ‘reverse transcription’ – it copies material in the reversed direction from DNA to RNA.” 

Covid is still seemingly running faster than humanity’s efforts to curb it, but Prof. Dockrell has some good news. “The coronavirus – and viruses like it – are not as able to make these changes. They are going to do it to some extent, but they are not going to be as successful as retroviruses and HIV.” 

And the other major thing to say: When the viruses make changes, there’s always what we call ‘a fitness cost’. Many of the potential changes that the virus could make will actually not favor its survival. So there are only a certain number, potentially, of changes that the virus can make, before it starts affecting its fitness. 

Now, unfortunately, we are still in a phase where Covid19 can continue to evolve and change. It’s not time to panic, though, because across the world various ways to adapt the current anti-Covid strategies are already in place. First of all, people should keep getting vaccines – maybe receiving slightly altered booster doses, Prof. Dockrell suggests, “in a way, that we, after all, have to do with influenza, by providing a seasonal influenza vaccine and changing it every year.” 

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“And maybe we have to keep changing some of the treatments like these new monoclonal antibodies against the virus, because they also may be limited by the emergence of a mutation of the virus evolving the S-protein,” he adds. 

Sounds promising – but won’t it become a never-ending race against constantly emerging mutations? 

Hopefully not. According to Prof. Dockrell, there are parts of viruses that scientists call ‘conserved areas’. With time, vaccines and monoclonal antibodies will target these areas, which the virus finds very hard to change. “Clearly, the direction of travel is to develop either vaccine responses that affect more different kinds of virus, or these ‘monoclonal antibodies’ that we could use to prevent or treat infection, that they will target more conserved areas and therefore will be less limited by the ability of these virus to evolve and change,” he concludes.

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As part of a special series on climate in partnership with The Intelligence Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Cipher Brief Expert and Senior Editor Kristin Wood, The Cipher Brief is focusing on the national security implications of climate change. 

This report is derived from a half-day conference in April 2021 co-sponsored by the Intelligence Project and the Environment and Natural Resources Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, along with the Center for Climate and Security and The Cipher Brief. It explores the requirements of the U.S. IC to fulfill the mission prescribed by President Biden, DNI Haines, and Secretary Kerry. The IC must rise to challenge, unshackled from the past, to re-imagine its role in combatting climate change.

The Authors

Calder Walton, Asst. Director, Belfer Center’s Applied History Project and Intelligence Project, Harvard University

Calder Walton is Assistant Director of the Belfer Center’s Applied History Project and Intelligence Project. Calder’s research is broadly concerned with intelligence history, grand strategy, and international relations. The

Sean Power, Masters in Public Policy Candidate, Harvard Kennedy School

Sean Power is a Masters in Public Policy 2021 candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School. Prior to HKS, he managed the analyst program at Kobre & Kim LLP, where he assisted on matters involving government enforcement defense and internal investigations.

The Report

The U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Avril Haines, has stated that climate change needs to be at the center of U.S. foreign policy and national security. It is a threat multiplier that impacts every function of government and society: territorial integrity, economic well-being, social stability, and military capabilities are all impacted by climate change, directly and indirectly. However, in addressing climate change, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is currently unsure of its mission space and hitherto has been relying on boilerplate responses to it. In an exclusive discussion, the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, Secretary John Kerry, who should be a principal consumer of intelligence about climate change within the U.S. government, stated that the U.S. IC must deliver significantly more.

The increasing effects of climate change are arising at a moment when the nature of intelligence itself is undergoing a revolution—from the collection of hidden secrets to collation of non-obvious (but knowable) data frequently hiding out in the open. This watershed in intelligence and national security requires bold, innovative, ideas for the U.S. IC to adapt and anticipate security threats derived by climate change. It must establish its mission space and alter its own architecture to ensure it is providing its customers with intelligence about them needed. Its mission will not be about spies disseminating secrets to policymakers; rather, it will require a new intelligence and national security paradigm that must reach across society, allowing the general public to consume climate intelligence and hold policymakers to account.

Background

The twenty-first century presents globalized threats that will require globalized solutions, the greatest of which is climate change. As the Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated, no country is immune from actor-less threats like novel disease outbreaks and climate change. When combined with other security threats like transnational terrorism and ubiquitous cyberattacks, it becomes clear that existing national security frameworks are insufficient. New relationships and lines of communication will need to be forged, both within the U.S. government, in the private sector, and internationally with allies and adversaries. The U.S. IC needs to determine the requirements of its customers regarding climate change and how its unique collection and analytical capabilities fit into this new mission space.

The IC has incorporated climate change into its analysis and threat assessments for decades, but climate has not received the attention it requires given the magnitude of the threat it poses. On January 27, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order on tackling the climate crisis at home and abroad, establishing that “climate considerations shall be an essential element of United States foreign policy and national security.” The order also called for the Director of National Intelligence to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on the national and economic security impacts of climate change within 120 days.

The Climate Change, Intelligence, and Global Security conference at Harvard’s Belfer Center earlier this year, brought together senior climate experts, current and former intelligence officers, and leaders in the private sector and academia to discuss the climate threat and generate innovative ideas on role the IC will play in combatting that threat. Led by Paul Kolbe, Director of the Intelligence Project, Kristin Wood, Intelligence Project Non-Resident Fellow, and Erin Sikorsky, Deputy Director of the Center for Climate and Security, the conference facilitated an urgent opportunity for productive dialogue on the climate threat.

Climate change as a threat to international security

Policymakers and the public need to understand that climate change impacts seemingly unrelated challenges and magnifies existing threats. The direct effects of climate change are readily apparent around the world—melting glaciers, rising sea levels, thawing permafrost, longer droughts, hotter heat waves, persistent wildfires, torrential rains, and catastrophic storm systems. These effects create disastrous consequences for humans like crop failures, fishery collapses, water insecurity, and the inundation of coastal regions, all of which lead to mass migration and displacement. These situations lead to fragile states and regions where increased conflict over scarce resources allows malign actors thrive. In this way, climate change is a threat multiplier that touches every aspect of international security.

Professor John P. Holdren, the Teresa and John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, noted that the big picture on how climate change will impact the planet is clear, but the detailed effects are difficult to predict with precision and confidence, in part because we do not know exactly how human societies will react. This uncertainty exacerbates the security threat posed by climate change. We know it will increase the number of displaced persons in the world, but we do not know when they will be displaced, how many there will be, or where they will go.

Climate change also impacts the effective functioning of the U.S. military: to meet traditional security threats and protect Americans at home and abroad. U.S. bases around the world function as launching pads for everything from quick tactical operations to large-scale disaster relief missions. When severe weather damages those bases or limits their ability to operate at full capacity, America’s security is put at risk. Disasters like the flooding at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, headquarters for U.S. Strategic Command, and Hurricane Michael’s destruction of Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida show that this threat knows no geographic bounds. Their effects are costly as well—the Air Force requested nearly $5 billion to rebuild those two bases alone.

The overall impacts of climate change on international security are inevitable, consequential, and predictable. Previously the U.S. government has undertaken more extensive, and expensive, actions on the basis of proportionally less intelligence about security threats. The U.S. IC must give climate change the proportional attention it deserves.

Role of U.S. intelligence in addressing climate change

Climate change poses an existential, global, non-state security threat, making it fundamentally different from past threats. Its unprecedented nature will require unprecedented thinking by the U.S. IC and requirements from it. Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon stated clearly that it is not enough to just say that the U.S. IC should focus more on climate— rather, the challenge lies in determining what its specific contribution will be, and then evaluating what changes need to occur to make that contribution happen. Answering these questions will require difficult, but necessary, upfront work. Without that work, the U.S. IC is likely to lead with its current capabilities, rather than identifying and developing capabilities needed to meet the nature of the new threat we face.

The U.S. IC must play to its strengths in carving out its climate mission. Intelligence is no longer just about stealing secrets; it is about providing policymakers with decision advantages to influence events, which is the same as the past, but with a key difference that doing so now requires mastery of is a vast eco-space of openly-available information. To accomplish its mission, the U.S. IC must leverage its analytic tradecraft to present objective assessments about climate change to policymakers. This means collecting intelligence, assessing it, removing bias, and delivering timely and relevant assessments to customers. The U.S. IC must also leverage its global relationships with partners and competitors in performing these tasks. These relationships lie below politics and can help elicit understanding that allows policymakers to distinguish facts on the ground from prevailing political rhetoric of the day.

The U.S. IC’s workforce and technology will need to advance and adapt to serve the climate mission. It does not need to have the foremost climate experts, but it does need to have dialogue with them, and develop its own climate expertise. Like other threats, the IC needs personnel that are devoted to understanding this new threat and understand its place in larger risk frameworks. Predictive models are critical to understanding climate science, and the IC should invest more resources into artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities (AI/ML) that can inform them. Intelligence professionals will not need to advance science, and scientists will not need to assess national security; but collaborations between the IC and the federal science community are necessary and will benefit both by allowing them to identify and meet shared objectives.

Climate change intelligence cannot be siloed. As DNI Haines promised, it must be integrated into traditional security threat assessments, and those emerging threats from other globalized challenges, bio-hazards, cyber capabilities, and weaponized information, if we want to understand how they interact and manifest around the globe. Compared to the twentieth century, when intelligence was dominated by governments, the twenty-first century offers more democratic forms of intelligence: the private sector offers major capabilities to collect and analyze intelligence. It has disrupted and transformed the nature of intelligence. The IC’s advantage in this new environment will come from thinking deeply about these issues and using its unique analytical and collection capabilities to identify patterns and trends others might overlook.

The future of intelligence cooperation and climate change

Climate change is an indiscriminating challenge unlike anything humanity has encountered before. Understanding how it is different helps illustrate the need for intelligence cooperation among states, large and small, to combat it. Carol Dumaine, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, noted that the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted many of the ways in which the climate threat is unique. It is non-state, non-adversarial, non-linear, boundary-less, and its root causes can be found in human economic activity. Unlike pandemics, however, combatting climate change will require something we have never done: decades of consistent cooperation across states with an eye towards tackling a systemic problem that will persist for centuries.

The U.S. IC needs to determine how it will work with other countries to combat the shared threat of climate change. The big first step is determining what the security collective is trying to accomplish. One area ripe for collaboration is foresight and early warning systems. During the Cold War the famous “red telephone” connected the White House and the Kremlin, enabling direct communication to avoid nuclear brinksmanship. Similar innovate thinking will be needed on climate change cooperation. Lt. Gen. Richard Nugee, Climate Change and Sustainability Strategy Lead for the UK Ministry of Defence, emphasized that the biggest danger on climate change is not a morass of bureaucracy, but instead a lack of imagination in understanding its impact and generating solutions for it.

Relying on existing partnerships, such as the Five Eyes alliance or NATO, will not be sufficient. Those agreements will play a role, but they do not include some of largest contributors to greenhouse gases or the countries that will suffer the largest initial impacts from climate change. Intelligence communities are by nature competitive and adversarial, but when it comes to climate change they will need to be cooperative. The U.S. IC needs to identify areas of cooperation even with adversaries like China and Russia. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow and former Director of the Intelligence Project, tasked the U.S. IC to look for a peace dividend—areas where collaboration on climate will yield multilateral benefits. Even though spying will still exist, as it always had, we cannot let espionage stand in the way of climate collaboration.

Any collaboration on climate intelligence will certainly require American leadership. That means America needs to treat the climate threat with the seriousness it deserves. Climate change is siloed into a one-page length analysis in the 27-page Annual Threat Assessment issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in April 2021. The six pages focusing on China and Russia make no mention of how those are contributing to climate change or working to combat it. The IC must continually reinforce that climate is a serious and central threat. We cannot wait until the impacts are painfully obvious for every individual across the globe to treat it with the seriousness it requires.

The private sector, intelligence, and climate change

The threat from climate change reinforces the fact that intelligence is no longer a domain solely for governments. Mekala Krishnan, Partner at the McKinsey Global Institute, underscored that the private sector is also seeking to take climate risk out of a sustainability silo and integrate it into all aspects of decision making affected by risk and finance. Companies are thinking about how climate interacts with physical capital, natural resources, labor supply, and food supply—the factors of production in an economy that fundamentally affect our lives and livelihoods. One of the most important factors in a country’s national security is the health of its economy. The U.S. IC needs to be working with the private sector to understand what the economic effects of climate change will be.

In many respects, the U.S. government is still one of the few parties that can afford the costs to collect data on climate change, much like space exploration and early Internet research. The private sector can innovate ways to extract insights from that public data. Harnessing that with government capabilities will require innovative public-private partnerships with a shared strategy to help combat climate change. The U.S. IC must develop a level of transparency on climate data that will allow the private sector to identify where incentives for research and development exist. It will not matter how good the climate intelligence collected by the U.S. IC is if it does not get into the hands of public and private users in the right shape and form.

At the same time, the IC cannot be everywhere at once, collecting troves of climate data at significant cost. Richard Jenkins, CEO of Saildrone, noted that the private sector has the capability to deploy significant private money to develop and test new technologies that advance climate data collection, which the government can purchase at great value and incorporate into climate intelligence analysis. New technology is democratizing intelligence; it will force the U.S. IC to change how it interacts with the private sector— for the better.

Conclusion

In a moderated discussion with Dr. Calder Walton, Secretary Kerry stated unambiguously that the U.S. IC needs to start providing policymakers with a decision advantage on climate change in order for the U.S. government to lead the world on meeting this unprecedented threat. That starts with treating climate change seriously. The U.S. IC will need to determine its requirements, play to its strengths, and adapt its workforce to best serve its mission. It will need to cultivate deeper cooperation with allies and adversaries, develop new relationships with the private sector, and approach climate change with a fresh mindset to seek and find what others overlook.

When it comes to climate change, the U.S. IC should also reframe who its customers are, not just policymakers, to whom it gives secret briefings, but also the public. By publicly disseminating assessments, the U.S. IC can effectively democratize intelligence about climate change, with the public holding policymakers to account for their actions or inactions on the basis of shared intelligence.

The Cipher Brief is proud to be continuing our coverage on Climate with a series of webcast briefings beginning in July 2021.

Read also:

The Climate and US National Security Conversation with Admiral Jim Stavridis (Ret.)

How to Integrate Climate in Future National Security Risk

Russia’s Climate Problem and Opportunity

Why the Intelligence Community Needs a Climate Change Task Force

 

The post Defining the IC’s Mission Space for Climate Change appeared first on The Cipher Brief.

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As the U.S. works toward getting more 11,000 Americans, diplomats and Afghan allies out of the country, what kind of Taliban should the U.S. expect to deal with in Afghanistan?  So far, there have been assurances from the Taliban that a new regime may not be as brutal as regimes past, but few who have worked with the Taliban believe the assurances.  How might the regime work with, or shelter groups like al-Qaeda, which is the reason why the U.S. entered into Afghanistan after 9/11.  And how might a massive-scale exodus of Afghans impact neighboring countries?

The Cipher Brief sat down with the former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norman T. Roule to get his expert-level perspective.

Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI

Cipher Brief Expert Norm Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017.  As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policy makers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.

The Cipher Brief: How would you characterize the international community’s response to the Taliban victory in Afghanistan?

Roule:  Historians of the future will likely describe the response to the Taliban victory as a strange mix of apathy and confusion.

In terms of apathy, there is extraordinary irony in the fact that after spending so much blood and treasure to defeat Da’esh efforts to establish an extremist Islamic Republic in Syria and impose its oppression over Iraqis and Syrians, the international community failed to prevent the creation of an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan. Many of the arguments behind our involvement in Syria – from a refugee crisis to the need to deny international Islamic militants a home to birth new terror groups – apply to Afghanistan. Whether or not one supported this decision, it is hard to avoid thinking that this episode will embolden militants worldwide.

In terms of confusion, we seem to be unable to accept that no one can predict the course and pace of crowd dynamics that so quickly eroded Afghan resistance. We live in a world where people acknowledge their inability to predict who will win our presidential elections but insist the Intelligence Community can somehow predict the day events will occur in a denied environment. But such a worst-case possibility should have been part of the planning deck and resourced on the ground accordingly.

The Cipher Brief: How would you expect the international community to respond in the coming days?

Roule: Absent a Taliban attack, operations at the airport should proceed more smoothly as our response architecture grows. Beyond that, much depends on how the Taliban act in the coming weeks. The group is not a monolith. Their success was highly likely as much a surprise to them as anyone. As they define their path and choose their leaders, there will be internal debates, jockeying for power, and perhaps some violent infighting.

In terms of indicators of the regime’s direction, we may want to consider the following questions:

First and foremost, how will the Taliban respond to our ongoing evacuation? Thus far, they seem willing to let us leave untouched, probably believing that the sooner we get out, the easier it will be for them to take control. At the same time, international media coverage of the evacuation will impose a strategic embarrassment on Washington.

Second, to what extent have the Taliban changed? They certainly understand that diplomacy played a role in their victory. Some of their leaders have spent hundreds of hours with foreign diplomats and traveled to multiple foreign capitals. How will these leaders merge such experiences into governance with more insular colleagues? They are likely to talk initially about compromise regarding women’s rights and inclusion of opponents in the government, but this may well be another effort to buy time. The international community has few pressure points over the group. How this plays out will be a good indicator of how they plan to run the country.

Next, how will they handle the issue of al-Qaida and other terrorists? We cannot overlook the deep connections between the Taliban and al-Qaida. If they believe the international community will limit its response to demarches, press statements, and empty sanctions, many in the group will be inclined to allow al-Qaida to reorganize.

Last, I would look at the refugee issue. They are likely to welcome external aid and allow at least some humanitarian groups to remain in country. Doing so requires no political concessions, addresses a domestic headache, and provides an opportunity for corruption. Humanitarian groups also offer a lever the Taliban can use against the West, i.e., refrain from criticizing us, or we will block your humanitarian operations. The Houthis have done this with great effect in Yemen.


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The Cipher Brief: How do you think will China, Russia, and other adversaries will respond to the withdrawal? 

Roule: Chinese propagandists have aggressively exploited our evacuation from Afghanistan. Its media is already claiming that these events show Taiwan that “once war breaks out in the Straits, the island’s defense will collapse in hours, and the US military won’t come to respond.” China’s press has also reportedly announced that the U.S. will not stand by Hong Kong activists.

Beijing, Tehran, and their proxies will likely point to the withdrawal as evidence that the U.S. is a declining power, unwilling or incapable of defending its friends. It will be lost on no one that whereas the U.S. has abandoned Afghanistan, Russia, China, and Iran have not wavered in support of their – admittedly few and otherwise isolated – allies.

In a worse case, if our adversaries believe the withdrawal reflects a lack of national resolve, they may be tempted to test our will on other issues. In this case, a miscalculation could lead to a conventional war in another theater.

The Cipher Brief: What would you say to those who say that the withdrawal demonstrates that the U.S. will only focus on strategic interests?

Roule:  Certainly, this argument has an appeal. It is true that our strategic adversaries like nothing better than the U.S. expending resources and diplomatic energy in such areas as Afghanistan, in part because we are, in essence, protecting their interests for free. But it does beg two questions.

First, what will happen differently next year regarding China, Russia, efforts to combat climate change, and cyber actors, now that we are out of Afghanistan? Second, what exactly is a U.S. strategic interest that we would protect? Estonia? Bahrain? Taiwan?

This argument also glosses over how others respond to such a posture. If a country perceives itself outside the international community’s protection, it will likely accommodate an aggressor. Our next call for a coalition of the willing will likely meet with less enthusiasm.

U.S. influence depends on the respect shown to us in multiple arenas. The echoes of this localized respect become self-reinforcing. We should think about what happens to collective international security if these echoes are silenced.

Last, this argument inherently argues that values are strategic interests. Unless violence directly touches Americans, we will limit our response to diplomacy and public statements. Such protests are unlikely to stop those behind a future Srebrenica massacre or the Rwandan genocide. Indeed, one can make a case that such a response might even encourage such events.

The Cipher Brief: How can the U.S. now best demonstrate its national resolve?

Roule:  As the saying goes, the best way to demonstrate national resolve is to demonstrate national resolve. Fair or not, this episode will tar the Biden administration. It doesn’t help that some allies reportedly have complained that the U.S. did not sufficiently consult with them on its decision to withdraw. Public criticism of the withdrawal decision by some of our closest European partners is growing. Adversaries will now consider their action through the lens of Afghanistan, much as the post-Vietnam malaise encouraged Soviet aggression in the 1970s.

I am not saying that we can’t reverse this situation. The U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984 caused many to question U.S. resolve. Although it did signal an end to U.S. (and international) efforts to eradicate Hezbollah, Reagan’s actions in other arenas (to include Afghanistan) restored the image of U.S. national resolve. Difficult diplomacy and a demonstration of our willingness to use military power when needed lay ahead.


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The Cipher Brief: What does the return of the Taliban mean for al-Qaeda?

Roule:  There is little reason to believe the Taliban-Al-Qaida relationship will not resume, although al-Qaeda is a fragmented and a pale version of its original stature. Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine the delight of its remaining leadership and cadres. Elements in Iran will likely seek to return to Afghanistan, perhaps assuring Iran that in exchange for tolerance of periodic transit of Iranian territory, the group will use its influence with the Taliban to protect Iran’s interests. We should watch for any signs of a return to Afghanistan by Zawahiri’s deputy, Sayf al-Adel, who is currently in Iran with other members of the group’s leadership council.

But al-Qaeda is not the only actor on this stage. Its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has not appeared for months and has far less influence than Osama Bin Laden. Afghanistan also hosts al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), ISIS, and other groups. The Taliban have emptied Afghanistan’s prisons which held deeply committed and dangerous militants who may gravitate to whatever new militant leadership might arise. But a lethal threat to Americans is sure to appear. The only questions are its size, goals, and reach.

The Cipher Brief: What does the U.S. withdrawal mean for China and Russia?

Roule: Both countries have sought to undercut U.S. influence in Afghanistan. They will each be delighted with the rhetorical violence of our internal debate over the withdrawal. But they also enjoyed the stability our engagement provided in a country so close to their borders.

Both countries have developed relations with the Taliban. I believe each hosted a Taliban delegation in recent weeks. It shouldn’t be lost on us that neither country felt compelled to withdraw its personnel from Kabul. That’s a pretty good sign of their confidence in the relationship.

Outside of Afghanistan, each will use the withdrawal to increase their influence with Central Asian actors – including Turkey. Coordination on terrorism and narcotics issues will come most easily. For example, Uzbekistan will worry that the Taliban will renew support of the violent Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has long maintained a presence in Afghanistan.

China’s concerns will be threefold. Beijing will use economic and diplomatic inducements to ensure that the Taliban do not encourage unrest among China’s oppressed Uighur population, let alone support the East Turkistan Islamic Movement or other Chinese militants in Xinjiang province. Next, Beijing will want to explore the Belt and Road access Afghanistan offers. Last, China will likely test whether it can achieve a commercially viable deal to mine Lithium and other minerals. In that mine operations require many years to develop and a vast amount of capital to construct, such arrangements are likely to be few given Afghanistan’s unpredictable political and security environment.

As for Russia, the U.S. withdrawal offers a chance for greater influence in Central Asia. We should watch for signs of new Russian military bases in the region. Moscow’s concern that Afghanistan will once more become a sanctuary for anti-Russian terrorists will also drive its relationship with the Taliban.

The Cipher Brief: What about Iran and Pakistan?

Roule: Iran has long maintained a relationship with Taliban elements. Reportedly, this involved sanctuary and provision of some weaponry. Tehran’s goals were to hedge its bets in Afghanistan, influence the enemies of the U.S., and protect the Shi’a of Afghanistan.

On the last point, Iran may have much work to do. Taliban personnel reportedly tore down Shi’a posters as they entered Kabul. Tehran must now contend with the consequences of refugees and the rise of warlords on its border.

The current head of Iran’s Qods Force, Esmail Qaani, has considerable experience on Afghan issues, and I expect he will play a prominent role in Iran’s response. We should watch to see how the Qods Force deploys its seasoned Afghan Fatemiyoun proxies from Syria.

Pakistan’s long-time relationship with the Taliban will give it more influence over the group than other countries. But Islamabad also will be on the receiving end of a flood of refugees, renewed militant terrorism in its loosely-controlled border areas, and Western pressure for its support of the Taliban. Ties to the Taliban may also complicate Islamabad’s relationship with India and China.

The Cipher Brief: What does this mean for the U.S. intelligence community?

Roule: The counterterrorism cadre of the US intelligence community and its partners have achieved extraordinary successes in the last years. But their work is now more complicated but no less urgent. For example, our withdrawal has reduced collection streams and potential access when the Afghanistan-based terrorist threat has only begun to grow. This challenge arrives as we shift counterterrorism resources from al-Qaeda to domestic extremists, cyber threats, and China.

The Cipher Brief: Any final comments?

Roule: If I may, I would like to close with a couple of brief comments.

First, we need to do everything we can to support personnel on the ground in Afghanistan. They – and their support teams at home – are trying to restore order in the middle of a hurricane. We are watching heroism at its best.

Next, the narrative of Afghanistan is unsurprisingly partisan. But politics shouldn’t obscure the truth. For more than twenty years, thousands of American and coalition partners volunteered to risk their lives in Afghanistan. We didn’t come to colonize. We didn’t steal Afghan resources. The operational goals were to bring Bin Laden to justice, destroy al-Qaeda, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for the group in the future. We also worked to transform Afghan society. The need for this last effort wasn’t apparent at the outset of our invasion. But it was likely unavoidable if we hoped to satisfy our values and enable Afghan society to confront its militant population. This effort represents the best of our values, and we owe all who served in this arena our most profound respect. Afghans who have participated in their country’s efforts during the past two decades will endure tremendous suffering. But they remain Afghanistan’s best hope and they deserve our support. Last, we need to end the fiction that Afghans didn’t fight for their country. Tens of thousands of Afghans were killed and wounded in the fight against al-Qaeda. Many involved in this fight are reportedly being sought door-to-door by the Taliban. Discounting their efforts may serve a political narrative, but it does them a terrible injustice.

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A large settlement of migrants in the suburbs of Dunkirk in northern France has been dismantled, in the wake of yet another wave of tensions with the UK over the growing number of illegal crossings.

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FILE PHOTO. ©REUTERS/Peter Cziborra
London & Paris trade barbs over Channel crossings

At my instruction, the security forces are evacuating the illegal migrant camp in Grande-Synthe this morning,” French Interior Minister Gerald Darmanin said on Twitter on Tuesday. He added that state services in the region would provide shelter for the group.

Government spokesman Gabriel Attal said the decision to dismantle the camp was primarily based on the intention to put people into shelters ahead of the winter season.

Around 1,500 migrants were evacuated from the site via buses and their tents removed. According to Utopia 56, one of the charities monitoring the process of dismantling the camp, people “were forced to board buses, without being informed of their destination, and some of their personal belongings have been destroyed.” 

In a separate tweet, Darmanin announced the arrest of 13 alleged migrant smugglers, “bringing the total to 1,308 since January.

These smugglers are criminals who exploit human misery, responsible for irregular immigration,” the minister wrote.

Tuesday’s actions by French authorities came in the wake of a phone call between Darmanin and his British counterpart Priti Patel. The two discussed the increasing number of illegal migrants attempting to cross the English Channel, and reiterated the importance of cooperation in making this route “unviable,” Patel said afterwards. 

The UK and France have a history of mutual accusations when it comes to illegal migration. While British officials have claimed that French authorities do not do enough to prevent migrants from embarking for the dangerous trip, France’s government has said that the UK should reform its labor market rules in order to become less attractive to migrants.

More than 23,000 people have crossed the Channel by boat this year, compared to 8,404 in 2020, according to Press Association figures.

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A pack of wild boars were rounded up and euthanized after one of the animals attacked a police officer in the streets of Hong Kong – the opening shot in a pitched battle between the feral hogs and the city’s law enforcement.

A group of veterinarians took seven wild boars into custody, euthanizing the beasts after knocking them out with dart guns in an area near the financial center of the city, according to a statement from Hong Kong’s Agriculture, Fisheries, and Conservation Department on Thursday.

The pigs were captured after one attacked a police officer last week, an act which reflects the city’s new policy toward the animals: stop them before they attack again.

The aggressive boar knocked down a police officer by biting his leg last week as the two faced off in a residential car park, the pig only losing the battle after falling off the building to its death. The wild boars are apparently “accustomed” to wandering back and forth along the roadway, begging for food from pedestrians and vehicles alike. Previously, the city had handled the population by capturing and sedating the animals, then relocating them to “remote areas,” according to the the department.

Hong Kong CEO Carrie Lam vowed to increase penalties for those citizens found feeding the boars, which have reportedly been responsible for some 30 attacks in recent years. While residents are warned not to feed the boars so as not to encourage population growth or disease outbreaks, the animals are a favorite among some visitors. Still, Lam insisted “we can’t simply sit on our hands while things deteriorate.”

Animal rights groups have responded with a protest letter against a policy of euthanasia, pointing out that most visitors do not feed the boars and arguing resources should be directed toward stopping the human activity rather than blaming all the boars. Allowing the boars to be captured and killed “ignores their right to live and considers their existence in urban areas as a capital offense,” the letter read.

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