People who live in the big cities are definitely masters of eavesdropping. Sometimes they can’t help it, accidentally overhearing conversations from complete strangers can be so funny, it’s hard not to share them with someone else. And here comes the fittingly named Instagram account Overheard San Francisco that’s dedicated to sharing the funniest eavesdropped interactions in San Francisco and the Bay area. Scroll down to see the funniest examples!

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

Funny conversation overheard in San Francisco.

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EXPERT OPINION — More than 200 U.S. officers have been hunted around the globe and targeted by an adversary using a mysterious weapon that causes permanent brain injury. It’s time to get serious about fighting back.

The Authors:

Paul Kolbe served for 25 years in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. He is currently Director of the Intelligence Project at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Marc Polymeropoulos worked for the CIA for 26 years. He is author of “Clarity in Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the CIA.

John Sipher worked for the CIA’s clandestine service for 28 years. He is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a co-founder of Spycraft Entertainment.

Prior to 9/11, al Qaida declared war on the United States, bombed the USS Cole, and blew up U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam. Despite heavy casualties, America viewed successive al Qaida terrorist attacks as somehow unique, not representative of a larger threat or state of war. We went about our business and failed to take hard action against al Qaida despite clear warning. Our failure to respond forcefully led to 9/11 and the two decades of war that followed.

Fast forward to today.  Since 2016, more than 200 U.S. officials have reportedly suffered from a mysterious series of symptoms which have caused long-lasting, debilitating injuries. Suffering from searing headaches, vertigo, vision impairment, and nausea, many victims have been formally diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries (TBI) at the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and other leading hospitals. Family members and young children have suffered as well. Some medical tests can now confirm the markers of brain injury, similar to those suffered by victims of concussive injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These injuries began with a cluster of reports from Cuba in 2016 and have become commonly referred to as Havana Syndrome. Moscow, Vienna, Belgrade, and Hanoi are among more than a dozen cities where U.S. officials reportedly have been attacked and injured. In residences, on the street, in vehicles, and even at secure U.S. facilities, U.S. officers are being hunted. Stunningly, even a close aide to CIA Director Bill Burns was reportedly attacked on a trip to India just this past August.

The CIA, after a period of confusion, delay, and even denial at times, now appears to take these threats very seriously. CIA Director Burns and Deputy Director David Cohen have publicly stated that U.S. officials are being “attacked.” They have improved health care for CIA officers who are hurt. And an agency task force is hard at work trying to obtain additional intelligence on those responsible. We credit Director Burns for his solid leadership.

The cause of these injuries? The National Academy of Sciences has pointed to Directed Energy Weapons – devices which emit microwave pulses which can inflict pain and damage tissue. The United States, Russia, China, and others have all developed Directed Energy Weapons to destroy equipment, counter drones, and control crowds. This is not science fiction.

Directed energy weapons would account for the highly directional and locational nature of these incidents. When victims can “move off the x,” the signature sounds, sensations, and pain that goes with the attacks often stop, though damage has already occurred. The amount of exposure seems to affect the degree of injury. Other technologies could be at play and are being investigated, but microwaves appear to be the most likely vector. Russia has used them before, flooding the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with microwave radiation for decades.

Regardless of form, the weapons being used in these attacks are nothing less than weapons of terror, designed to cause injury to non-combatants. Who would use such a weapon to attack U.S. intelligence officers, diplomats, and military personnel, and to what conceivable end?


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CIA Deputy Director Cohen stated at a recent intelligence summit, that the U.S. was closer to identifying the culprit, and Politico has reported that members of the Senate Intelligence Committee are increasingly convinced that Russia or another hostile adversary is behind the attack, although reportedly, no smoking gun has been found.

As former CIA operations officers with extensive experience dealing with both counterterrorism and counterintelligence issues, we have few doubts about who will be named as the culprit. For at least a decade, Russia has conducted itself as in a state of conflict with the West in general and the United States in particular. Russia has launched cyberattacks impacting critical infrastructure and supply chains, assassinated opponents with nuclear poisons and chemical weapons, gunned down people in the streets using criminal proxies, sabotaged a Czech ammunition depot, and mounted a violent coup attempt in Montenegro. It has also bombarded the U.S. embassy in Moscow with microwave radiation and used carcinogenic “spy dust” without regard to health effects. The attacks on U.S. officials would fit this pattern of behavior.

We recognize that it is important to let the intelligence community do its job and its findings must inform policy action. Congress and the administration must work together to formulate a range of possible responses and it is not too early to begin. As Senator Collins and others have stated, these attacks are “an act of war,” and as such, preparation for a future attribution call by the national security establishment is in order. So how could the U.S. respond?

Let’s start with what doesn’t work – sanctions. Sanctions feel good and satisfy an action imperative but they are feckless. Sanctions have not stopped Russia from killing dissidents, halted the Nordstream II pipeline, compelled a pull back from occupied territories, reduced support for tyrants, or hindered oil and gas production. Sanctions have simply forced Russia to develop more creative money laundering and sanction circumvention mechanisms.

So, what would work? For starters, we must understand that the Putin regime considers itself in a state of conflict with the U.S., short of war, but nonetheless deadly real. We are dealing with a state sponsor of terror which conducts operations across the globe to weaken the U.S. abroad, divide it from its allies, and sow discord at home. Our policy must be calibrated to win this conflict, without sparking a shooting war, but at risk of one.

Russia understands reciprocity and strength. When four Russian diplomats were kidnapped by extremists in Beirut in 1985, and one of them was killed, Russia reportedly responded by kidnapping and gruesomely killing a relative of the group’s leader. The surviving diplomats were released immediately. The story may be apocryphal, but it does illustrate the Russian approach. Tempting as it may be for America to retaliate tit for tat, we need not mirror Russia’s actions. Instead, we should play to our greater economic, diplomatic, and military advantages.

We offer five elements to frame a response: enlist U.S. allies, expand forward deterrence, limit the adversary’s reach, choke off money, and bring those accountable to justice.

NATO: With proof of the attacks on U.S. officials, we should activate NATO’s Article Five collective defense clause. The only other time this was enacted was after 9/11. As justification, in addition to the Havana Syndrome attacks, (which also caused Canadian casualties), we would include GRU and FSB assassination operations across Europe, deadly sabotage in the Czech Republic, a coup attempt in Montenegro, persistent cyberattacks, and a litany of other actions that can only be described as irregular warfare directed against NATO members.


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Forward Presence: A crystal clear signal that we understand the nature of Russian hybrid warfare and are responding would be to enhance our deployed military presence in Poland, the Baltic States, and in the Black Sea region. These units would pose no offensive threat to Russia but would be a clear signal that the U.S. is prepared to counter any Russian shenanigans. We should also significantly ramp up our lethal aid and training to the Ukraine, where the nature of Russian aggression is well known. Weakness in Eastern Europe is an invitation to conflict.

Travel and Presence: We should drastically limit Russian business and tourist travel which is being used as cover for FSB and GRU operations. We would reduce Russian diplomatic presence in each capital to the bare minimum – handfuls not hundreds. American and European counterintelligence experts believe there are more Russian intelligence officers operating from embassies than during the Cold War. Limiting the size of Russia’s espionage infrastructure will complicate the planning and execution of all of its intelligence operations.

Finance: A key tool in counterterrorism operations is the ability to target sources of finance which constitute material support to terrorism. In this case, we would apply that principle to the Russian government, state enterprises, and individuals who provide cover, tools, and sources of funding to Russia’s campaign to undermine the West with violence, terror, and media manipulation. Russia’s dirty money has been used to undermine the west and poison our politics. We should limit the easy access of shady money to western banks.

Criminal Cases: We need bring war crime cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague. Following a decade of conflict in the Balkans, the ICJ brought to justice 161 indicted Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian war criminals. This was an astounding success – a manhunt which included American and European law enforcement and intelligence services. Just as in Nuremberg after World War II, these actions to hold war criminals accountable drew a line in the sand.

This is a start.  Successive Democratic and Republican administrations have pursued Russia policies which represent the triumph of hope over experience. We have treated the symptoms of malign Russian actions rather than the underlying pathology. It is now time to finally acknowledge that we are in a long-term hybrid conflict and forget the fantasy of changing Putin’s behavior. Only a new regime in the Kremlin would hold the hope of bringing about a change in actions. Eventually, the Putin regime will wither or collapse, but until it does, we and our allies must do a better job of defending ourselves.

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Australia’s Jewish community has condemned the repeated displays of Nazi references at anti-vaccine and anti-lockdown rallies in Victoria, some of which saw the state premier depicted as Adolf Hitler.

Daniel Aghion, the president of the Jewish Community Council of Victoria, claims that references to the genocidal regime of the Nazis amid the current unrest over pandemic rules is a false equivalence.

“The Nazis had the intention of wiping from the face of the Earth a race or religion simply because of what they were,” Aghion told Guardian Australia. “Nothing in the current proposals is remotely like that, and the comparison to Nazi Germany is therefore shocking, inappropriate and wrong,” he added.

Aghion’s comments come after demonstrators, protesting against pandemic laws, referenced Nazi Germany in an effort to make their point. Some carried placards depicting state premier, Daniel Andrews, as Hitler. 

 Wendy Lovell, a Liberal MP, had also claimed laws proposed to govern future pandemics were similar to Germany’s 1933 Enabling Act – which allowed the Reich government to issue laws without the consent of parliament and preceded atrocities, most notably the Holocaust.

MP Bernie Finn had gone as far as to share a social media post depicting the state premier as Hitler. It was later deleted.Laws proposed by Andrews seek to grant powers to the state leaders in the event of another pandemic. Under the move, the minister “may make any order… that the minister believes is reasonably necessary to protect public health.” 

Opponents claim the legislation, which would see power concentrated with the head of state and health minister, is too broad and far reaching.

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American billionaire Bill Gates has claimed Covid-19 deaths and infections may drop below seasonal flu levels next year as more people get vaccinated and treatment improves, unless we encounter a new, more deadly variant.

Speaking on Thursday in a virtual interview at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Singapore, founder of Microsoft stated that vaccines, natural immunity and emerging oral treatments mean that “the death rate and the disease rate ought to be coming down pretty dramatically.”  

The tech mogul, who has been particularly vocal during the pandemic, said issues around vaccine-production capacity are likely to be replaced by distribution challenges and even waning demand.

“The vaccines are very good news, and the supply constraints will be largely solved as we get out in the middle of next year, and so we’ll be limited by the logistics and the demand,” he noted. 

He also told his audience that it remains to be seen how much demand there is for Covid-19 shots in places like Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Calling for more work to eradicate flu, Gates claimed Covid-19 rates and deaths would possibly fall below those of flu by the middle of next year, unless more deadly coronavirus variants emerge. 

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has involved itself in the development of vaccines and virus surveillance, calling for a global response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The foundation has invested hundreds of millions dollars in the development and distribution of potentially lifesaving shots. 

According to the World Health Organization, influenza kills up to 650,000 people each year. At least five million people have died from Covid-19 since the pandemic began in late 2019.

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Corin Stone, Washington College of Law

Corin Stone is a Scholar-in-Residence and Adjunct Professor at the Washington College of Law.  Stone is on leave from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) where, until August 2020, she served as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy & Engagement, leading Intelligence Community (IC) initiatives on artificial intelligence, among other key responsibilities. From 2014-2017, Ms. Stone served as the Executive Director of the National Security Agency (NSA).

(Editor’s Note: This article was first published by our friends at Just Security and is the third in a series that is diving into the foundational barriers to the broad integration of AI in the IC – culture, budget, acquisition, risk, and oversight.)

OPINION — As I have written earlier, there is widespread bipartisan support for radically improving the nation’s ability to take advantage of artificial intelligence (AI). For the Intelligence Community (IC), that means using AI to more quickly, easily, and accurately analyze increasing volumes of data to produce critical foreign intelligence that can warn of and help defuse national security threats, among other things. To do that, the IC will have to partner closely with the private sector, where significant AI development occurs. But despite the billions of dollars that may ultimately flow toward this goal, there are basic hurdles the IC still must overcome to successfully transition and integrate AI into the community at speed and scale.

Among the top hurdles are the U.S. government’s slow, inflexible, and complex budget and acquisition processes. The IC’s rigid budget process follows the standard three-year cycle for the government, which means it takes years to incorporate a new program and requires confident forecasting of the future. Once a program overcomes the necessary hurdles to be included in a budget, it must follow a complex sequence of regulations to issue and manage a contract for the actual goods or services needed. These budget and acquisition processes are often considered separately as they are distinct, but I treat them together because they are closely related and inextricably intertwined in terms of the government’s purchasing of technology.

Importantly, these processes were not intended to obstruct progress; they were designed to ensure cautious and responsible spending, and for good reason. Congress, with its power of the purse, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as the executive branch’s chief budget authority, have the solemn duty to ensure wise and careful use of taxpayer dollars. And their roles in this regard are vital to the U.S. government’s ability to function.

Unfortunately, despite the best of intentions, as noted by some in Congress itself, the budget process has become so “cumbersome, frustrating, and ineffective” that it has weakened the power of the purse and Congress’ capacity to govern. And when complicated acquisition processes are layered on top of the budget process, the result is a spider web of confusion and difficulty for anyone trying to navigate them.

The Need for Speed … and Flexibility and Simplicity

As currently constructed, government budget and acquisition processes cause numerous inefficiencies for the purchase of AI capabilities, negatively impacting three critical areas in particular: speed, flexibility, and simplicity. When it comes to speed and flexibility, the following difficulties jump out:

  • The executive branch has a methodical and deliberate three-year budget cycle that calls for defined and steady requirements at the beginning of the cycle. Changing the requirements at any point along the way is difficult and time-consuming.
  • The IC’s budgeting processes require that IC spending fit into a series of discrete sequential steps, represented by budget categories like research, development, procurement, or sustainment. Funds are not quickly or easily spent across these categories.
  • Most appropriations expire at the end of each fiscal year, which means programs must develop early on, and precisely execute, detailed spending plans or lose the unspent funds at the end of one year.
  • Government agencies expend significant time creating detailed Statements of Work (SOWs) that describe contract requirements. Standard contract vehicles do not support evolving requirements, and companies are evaluated over the life of the contract based on strict compliance with the original SOW created years earlier.

These rules make sense in the abstract and result from well-intentioned attempts to buy down the risk of loss or failure and promote accountability and transparency. They require the customer to know with clarity and certainty the solution it seeks in advance of investment and they narrowly limit the customer’s ability to change the plan or hastily implement it. These rules are not unreasonably problematic for the purchase of items like satellites or airplanes, the requirements for which probably should not and will not significantly change over the course of many years.

However, because AI technology is still maturing and the capabilities themselves are always adapting, developing, and adding new functionality, the rules above have become major obstacles to the quick integration of AI across the IC. First, AI requirements defined with specificity years in advance of acquisition – whether in the budget or in a statement of work – are obsolete by the time the technology is delivered. Second, as AI evolves there is often not a clear delineation between research, development, procurement, and sustainment of the technology – it continuously flows back and forth across these categories in very compressed timelines. Third, it is difficult to predict the timing of AI breakthroughs, related new requirements, and funding impacts, so money might not be spent as quickly as expected and could be lost at the end of the fiscal year. Taken together, these processes are inefficient and disruptive, cause confusion and delay, and discourage engagement from small businesses, which have neither the time nor the resources to wait years to complete a contract or to navigate laborious, uncertain processes.


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Simply put, modern practices for fielding AI have outpaced the IC’s decades-old approach to budgeting and acquisition. That AI solutions are constantly evolving, learning, and improving both undermines the IC’s ability to prescribe a specific solution and, in fact, incentivizes the IC to allow the solution to evolve with the technology. The lack of flexibility and speed in how the IC manages and spends money and acquires goods and services is a core problem when it comes to fully incorporating AI into the IC’s toolkit.

Even while we introduce more speed and agility into these processes, however, the government must continue to ensure careful, intentional, and appropriate spending of taxpayer dollars. The adoption of an IC risk framework and modest changes to congressional oversight engagements, which I address in upcoming articles, will help regulate these AI activities in the spirit of the original intent of the budget and acquisition rules.

As for the lack of simplicity, the individually complex budget and acquisition rules are together a labyrinth of requirements, regulations, and processes that even long-time professionals have trouble navigating. In addition:

  • There is no quick or simple way for practitioners to keep current with frequent changes in acquisition rules.
  • The IC has a distributed approach that allows each element to use its various acquisition authorities independently rather than cohesively, increasing confusion across agency lines.
  • Despite the many federal acquisition courses aimed at demystifying the process, there is little connection among educational programs, no clear path for IC officers to participate, and no reward for doing so.

The complexity of the budget and acquisition rules compounds the problems with speed and flexibility, and as more flexibility is introduced to support AI integration, it is even more critical that acquisition professionals be knowledgeable and comfortable with the tools and levers they must use to appropriately manage and oversee contracts.

Impactful Solutions: A Target Rich Environment

Many of these problems are not new; indeed, they have been highlighted and studied often over the past few years in an effort to enable the Department of Defense (DOD) and the IC to more quickly and easily take advantage of emerging technology. But to date, DOD has made only modest gains and the IC is even further behind. While there are hundreds of reforms that could ease these difficulties, narrowing and prioritizing proposed solutions will have a more immediate impact. Moreover, significant change is more likely to be broadly embraced if the IC first proves its ability to successfully implement needed reforms on a smaller scale. The following actions by the executive and legislative branches – some tactical and some strategic – would be powerful steps to ease and speed the transition of AI capabilities into the IC.

Statements of Objectives

A small but important first step to deal with the slow and rigid acquisition process is to encourage the use of Statements of Objectives (SOO) instead of SOWs, when appropriate. As mentioned, SOWs set forth defined project activities, deliverables, requirements, and timelines, which are used to measure contractor progress and success. SOWs make sense when the government understands with precision exactly what is needed from the contractor and how it should be achieved.

SOOs, on the other hand, are more appropriate when the strategic outcome and objectives are clear, but the steps to achieve them are less so. They describe “what” without dictating “how,” thereby encouraging and empowering industry to propose innovative solutions. SOOs also create clarity about what is important to the government, leading companies to focus less on aggressively low pricing of specific requirements and more on meeting the ultimate outcomes in creative ways that align with a company’s strengths. This approach requires knowledgeable acquisition officers as part of the government team, as described below, to ensure the contract includes reasonable milestones and decision points to keep the budget within acceptable levels.


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New Authorities for the IC

Two new authorities would help the IC speed and scale its use of AI capabilities: Other Transaction Authority (OTA)  and Commercial Solutions Openings (CSO). Other Transaction Authority allows specific types of transactions to be completed outside of the traditional federal laws and regulations that apply to standard government procurement contracts, providing significantly more speed, flexibility, and accessibility than traditional contracts. While OTA is limited in scope and not a silver bullet for all acquisition problems, OTA has been used to good effect since 1990 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Activity (DARPA), DOD’s over-the-horizon research and development organization, among others.

CSOs are a simplified and relatively quick solicitation method to award firm fixed price contracts up to $100 million. CSOs can be used to acquire innovative commercial items, technologies, or services that close capability gaps or provide technological advances through an open call for proposals that provide offerors the opportunity to respond with technical solutions of their own choosing to a broadly defined area of government interest. CSOs are considered competitively awarded regardless of how many offerors respond.

Both OTA and CSO authority should be immediately granted to the IC to improve the speed and flexibility with which the IC can acquire and transition AI into the IC.

Unclassified Sandbox

The predictive nature of the IC’s work and the need to forecast outcomes means the IC must be able to acquire AI at the point of need, aligned to the threat. Waiting several years to acquire AI undermines the IC’s ability to fulfill its purpose. But with speed comes added risk that new capabilities might fail. Therefore, the IC should create an isolated unclassified sandbox, not connected to operational systems, in which potential IC customers could test and evaluate new capabilities alongside developers in weeks-to-months, rather than years. Congress should provide the IC with the ability to purchase software quickly for test and evaluation purposes only to buy down the risk that a rapid acquisition would result in total failure. The sandbox process would allow the IC to test products, consider adjustments, and engage with developers early on, increasing the likelihood of success.

Single Appropriation for Software

DOD has a pilot program that funds software as a single budget item – allowing the same money to be used for research, production, operations, and sustainment – to improve and speed software’s unique development cycle. AI, being largely software, is an important beneficiary of this pilot. Despite much of the IC also being part of DOD, IC-specific activities do not fall within this pilot. Extending DOD’s pilot to the IC would not only speed the IC’s acquisition of AI, but it would also increase interoperability and compatibility of IC and DOD projects.

No-Year Funds

Congress should reconsider the annual expiration of funds as a control lever for AI. Congress already routinely provides no-year funding when it makes sense to do so. In the case of AI, no-year funds would allow the evolution of capabilities without arbitrary deadlines, drive more thoughtful spending throughout the lifecycle of the project, and eliminate the additional overhead required to manage the expiration of funds annually. Recognizing the longer-term nature of this proposal, however, the executive branch also must seek shorter-term solutions in the interim.

A less-preferable alternative is to seek two-year funding for AI. Congress has a long history of proposing biennial budgeting for all government activities. Even without a biennial budget, Congress has already provided nearly a quarter of the federal budget with two-year funding. While two-year funding is not a perfect answer in the context of AI, it would at a minimum discourage parties from rushing to outcomes or artificially burning through money at the end of the first fiscal year and would provide additional time to fulfill the contract. This is presumably why DOD recently created a new budget activity under their Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) category, which is typically available for two years, for “software and digital technology pilot programs.”

AI Technology Fund

Congress should establish an IC AI Technology Fund (AITF) to provide kick-starter funds for priority community AI efforts and enable more flexibility to get those projects off the ground. To be successful, the AITF must have no-year funds, appropriated as a single appropriation, without limits on usage throughout the acquisition lifecycle. The AITF’s flexibility and simplicity would incentivize increased engagement by small businesses, better allowing the IC to tap into the diversity of the marketplace, and would support and speed the delivery of priority AI capabilities to IC mission users.


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ICWERX  

To quickly take advantage of private sector AI efforts at scale, the IC must better understand the market and more easily engage directly with the private sector. To do so, the IC should create an ICWERX, modeled after AFWERX, an Air Force innovation organization that drives agile public-private sector collaboration to quickly leverage and develop cutting-edge technology for the Air Force. AFWERX aggressively uses innovative, flexible, and speedy procurement mechanisms like OTA and the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs (SBIR/STTR) to improve the acquisition process and encourage engagement from small businesses. AFWERX is staffed by acquisition and market research experts who are comfortable using those authorities and understand the market. While the IC’s needs are not identical, an ICWERX could serve as an accessible “front door” for prospective partners and vendors, and enable the IC to more quickly leverage and scale cutting-edge AI.

De-mystify Current Authorities

While there is much complaining about a lack of flexible authorities in the IC (and a real need for legal reform), there is flexibility in existing rules that has not been fully utilized. The IC has not prioritized the development or hiring of people with the necessary government acquisition and contracts expertise, so there are insufficient officers who know how to use the existing authorities and those who do are overworked and undervalued. The IC must redouble its efforts to increase its expertise in, and support the use of, these flexibilities in several ways.

First, the IC should create formal partnerships and increase engagement with existing U.S. government experts. The General Services Administration’s Technology Transformation Services (TTS) and FEDSIM, for example, work across the federal government to build innovative acquisition solutions and help agencies more quickly adopt AI. In addition, DOD’s Joint AI Center has built significant acquisition expertise that the IC must better leverage. The IC also should increase joint duty rotations in this area to better integrate and impart acquisition expertise across the IC.

Second, the IC must prioritize training and education of acquisition professionals. And while deep acquisition expertise is not necessary for everyone, it is important for lawyers, operators, technologists, and innovators to have a reasonable understanding of the acquisition rules, and the role they each play in getting to successful outcomes throughout the process. Collaboration and understanding across these professions and up and down the chain of command will result in more cohesive, speedy, and effective outcomes.

To that end, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) should work with the many existing government acquisition education programs, as well as the National Intelligence University, to develop paths for IC officers to grow their understanding of and ability to navigate and successfully use acquisition rules. The ODNI also should strengthen continuing education requirements and create incentive pay for acquisition professionals.

Third, the IC should prioritize and use direct hire authority to recruit experts in government acquisition, to include a mix of senior term-limited hires and junior permanent employees with room to grow and the opportunity for a long career in the IC. Such a strategy would allow the IC to quickly tackle the current AI acquisition challenges and build a bench of in-house expertise.

Finally, practitioners should have an easily accessible reference book to more quickly discover relevant authorities, understand how to use them, and find community experts. A few years ago, the ODNI led the creation of an IC Acquisition Playbook, which describes common IC acquisition authorities, practices, and usages. The ODNI should further develop and disseminate this Playbook as a quick win for the IC.

Incentivize Behavior

To encourage creative and innovative acquisition practices, as well as interdisciplinary collaboration, the IC must align incentives with desired outcomes and create in acquisition professionals a vested interest in the success of the contract. Acquisition officers today are often brought into projects only in transactional ways, when contracts must be completed or money must be obligated, for example. They are rarely engaged early as part of a project team, so they are not part of developing the solutions and have minimal investment in the project’s success. Reinforcing this, acquisition professionals are evaluated primarily on the amount of money they obligate by the end of the fiscal year, rather than on the success of a project.

Therefore, to start, project teams should be required to engage acquisition officers early and often, both to seek their advice and to ensure they have a good understanding of the project’s goals. In addition, evaluation standards for acquisition officers should incorporate effective engagement and collaboration with stakeholders, consideration of creative alternatives and options, and delivery of mission outcomes. If an officer uses innovative practices that fail, that officer also should be evaluated on what they learned from the experience that may inform future success.

Lastly, the ODNI should reinvigorate and highlight the IC acquisition awards to publicly reward desired behavior, and acquisition professionals should be included in IC mission team awards as a recognition of their impact on the ultimate success of the mission.

Conclusion

Between the government’s rigid budget and acquisition processes and confusion about how to apply them, there is very little ability for the IC to take advantage of a fast-moving field that produces new and updated technology daily. Tackling these issues through the handful of priority actions set forth above will begin to drive the critical shift away from the IC’s traditional, linear processes to the more dynamic approaches the IC needs to speed and transform the way it purchases, integrates, and manages the use of AI.

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Colder weather is settling in around much of the globe and after a year and a half of managing a global pandemic, energy markets are more complicated than ever.  The U.S. petroleum inventory is at its lowest level since 2015, the UK is experiencing a severe energy crisis, Russia continues to push Germany on the Nordstream II pipeline and winter has already come to China, which has experienced weeks of rolling blackouts. What does all of this mean as both state and non-state cyber actors continue to take aim at energy infrastructure?

The Cipher Brief spoke with energy expert Norm Roule, a top adviser on energy issues, to get a sense of where we’re headed.

Norman T. Roule served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East.  He served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017.  As NIM-I, he was the principal Intelligence Community (IC) official responsible for overseeing all aspects of national intelligence policy and activities related to Iran, to include IC engagement on Iran issues with senior policy makers in the National Security Council and the Department of State.

The Cipher Brief: Give us a brief snapshot of the global energy market today and what you think we will see in the coming months.

Roule: The energy market is working through what will hopefully be the final phase of a perfect storm of market distortions ignited by the pandemic and influenced by shifts in capital markets and climate change initiatives. I say the final phase because most countries are returning to growth and pre-pandemic energy consumption. Most of the drivers of this final phase will likely push prices upward in the near term. A few involve long-known issues that are now coming into play. A few remain unpredictable. Ancillary industries that rely on oil, gas, or distillates as significant feedstocks will either raise prices or shift production to areas with less exposure to hydrocarbons. In short, in the coming weeks, consumers should expend to not only pay more at the gas pump but at the supermarket and mall.  We are likely to see relief in the Spring as the pandemic and supply chain distortions wane, seasonal demands on oil and gas pass, and energy producers ramp up operations to exploit high prices. China’s economy also shows signs of slowing, and financial packages meant to jump-start global economies will run their course.

The Cipher Brief: Energy markets seem more complicated than ever. What are the primary variables at play?

Roule: Global oil consumption is now back to 100 million barrels per day, a statistic last seen when the pandemic hit. Production is up, but the most crucial trend in recent months has been the deep draw on the glut of oil stocks during the pandemic. Producers – especially OPEC – have constrained production to reflect their cautious approach to market stability and their desire to reduce the stockpiles accumulated during the pandemic. As a result, stocks are now lower than before the pandemic. If you exclude the strategic petroleum reserve, the U.S. petroleum inventory is at a level not seen since 2014-2015. Stockpiles at Cushing are at a similar level. U.S. gasoline stocks are around five million barrels below pre-pandemic seasonal averages.

U.S. producers have consolidated, and the industry prioritizes return on equity over expansion, particularly in a political environment that is increasingly hostile to hydrocarbon production. As a result, U.S. oil production is still about 1.7 million barrels a day below pre-pandemic levels. Add to this the push to reduce carbon emissions, gas supply cuts, and some supply chain distortions, and you get a surge in gas prices and a need for oil (and coal) to replace gas in electricity production, as we see in China.

The Cipher Brief: The administration seems to be blaming OPEC plus for high oil prices. What’s happening within the cartel?  How does the cartel see the current energy market?

Roule: OPEC’s role in oil markets remains deeply significant. The cartel produces 40 percent of the world’s oil, but 60 percent of the world’s total traded exports. That inevitably gives it an important voice. It is also clear that OPEC+ leaders remain confident in their strategy to maintain market stability and benefit from prices that are not so high that they ignite demand destruction. OPEC discipline during this turbulent period has been quite good, especially given that it is far from a monolith of views and capabilities. For example, the UAE would likely support additional production. Moscow makes positive noises about its willingness to increase production, but it follows Riyadh’s lead for the revenue and political advantage it derives from the current market.  

Riyadh remains the architect of OPEC’s approach. Kuwait and Baghdad seem comfortable with this strategy. Production restraint is made easier because about half of OPEC’s members reportedly are unable to meet production quotas due to technical problems, mismanagement, or a lack of capital investment. This list includes Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Libya, and Venezuela.  

OPEC decision-making likely rests on a handful of variables, some predictable, others not. The cartel has done well in its assessments of global recovery and pandemic impact. But questions remain on aviation recovery. Likewise, even their best analysts have a tough time predicting the impact of speculators, weather trends, and the future of sanctions on Iran and Venezuela. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will do what they can to avoid the financial and political consequences of inflation and any energy-instigated recession.

The strains in US-Saudi relations appear to have undermined Riyadh’s sympathy for Washington’s challenges. The Saudis are tired of being a political target within the U.S. They also seem to believe that while the U.S. touts itself as being interested in only renewable energy sources, it has no problem criticizing the Kingdom when high gas prices become a political issue. Last, we should recall that it was only in May 2020 that a group of Republican Senators publicly called on Saudi Arabia, demanding that it stabilize the energy market. From Riyadh’s perspective, it has done precisely that.

The Cipher Brief: Are the Gulf oil producers serious about renewable energy? 

Roule: Absolutely. Regional leaders certainly understand the consequences of climate change for their people. In recent years, the region has experienced some of the highest temperatures on record, causing concern that, if unchecked, the trend could make portions of the Middle East unlivable.

But their approach is different from ours and as we all know, Gulf economies rely heavily on revenues from hydrocarbons. To varying degrees, all the Gulf states are trying to diversify their economies. But they also want to avoid a situation in which they are stuck with stranded strategic assets. In the West, our climate narrative tends to focus on ending the use of hydrocarbons. As with Norway, Gulf producers claim that they will use the resources from their oil revenues to fund the transition to a new energy economy.


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Their focus tends to be a balance between a reduction of emissions and reduction of hydrocarbon use. Recent weeks have seen multiple significant events in the Gulf in which they tried to highlight their decision to expend resources and political bandwidth on green technologies, hydrogen production, and carbon capture solutions. We will also see increasing efforts to plant trees and to rely on natural gas instead of oil for power generation. They also claim they will try to end gas flaring and reduce methane emissions. I don’t think these efforts will satisfy Western environmental activists who demand an end to oil use, but the trend is undeniable.

The Cipher Brief: What is happening with U.S. oil and gas producers?  How are they responding to changing conditions?

Roule: Much has changed in the last two years. First, the sector underwent significant consolidation. The larger publicly-held companies must satisfy investors and financial institutions with a steady return on equity over the growth. Washington has cooled on its support for the industry. The decision to kill the Keystone Pipeline and limit drilling on federal property has contributed to industry reluctance on expansion. Last, some investors are pushing for companies to devote more attention to renewable energy sources.  During the pandemic, this reduced capital investment to about half of average expenditure, thus producing our current limited production capacity. U.S. rig count has significantly improved over the past year, but not on a scale that would return U.S. production to pre-pandemic levels. In the near term, smaller privately-held firms are likely to spend the resources to expand production with public firms following once they get a sense of what 2022 will bring.

The results speak for themselves. At the beginning of the pandemic, the U.S. produced around 12.8 million barrels of oil per day (BPD). By May 2020, production declined to 9.7 million BPD, and with recovery is now approximately 11.3 million BPD.  We are once again a net importer, bringing in about 1.3 million BPD in October.

We have seen a broader recovery in gas production, particularly in Texas. But a lack of production, low stockpiles, and unprecedented demand from abroad means consumers will face high bills if winter is severe or the risk of short supplies. Beyond heating, gas-fired power plants produce more than 50% of New England’s electricity, for example, so that any price spike will play out elsewhere in the economy.

The Cipher Brief: Is there a policy response to this situation?

Roule: I think policymakers globally are praying for a mild winter. But beyond this, policy options are few in the near term. A release from the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) is conceivable. Still, we should remember the SPR was established for national emergencies and not a piggy bank to manage gas prices in an election year. Domestic producers will take a while to ramp up production, but policymakers will find this tough to seek in the current political environment. The administration could ban oil and gas exports or allow Congress to pass legislation enabling the federal government to sue OPEC for its cartel activities. Either step would invite predictable and unwelcome diplomatic consequences. 

Although the American public demands cheap energy, it isn’t enthusiastic about supporting the infrastructure needed to achieve this, even if the power is produced elsewhere.  Let me cite a couple of recent examples:

• Maine voters just rejected the construction of a billion-dollar electric line that would have delivered Canadian hydro-power electricity to New England.

• The administration is wrestling with a decision as to whether it should shut a pipeline that carries crude oil from Canada to refineries across Wisconsin, Michigan, and the Great Lakes region. 

If the administration hopes to convince OPEC members to increase production, it will improve relations with Gulf Arabs. It might be possible to convince Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE to lift production to cover the exports of OPEC members unable to meet their production quotas. In an extreme situation, the administration might consider a temporary oil export waiver to Iran as a sign of goodwill. I think the political blowback on the latter rules it out, but the possibility is there. 

The Cipher Brief: The United Kingdom seems to be working its way through a severe energy crisis. How did this happen, and what are its policymakers doing in response?

Roule: The United Kingdom’s energy challenge is significant. As with other countries, it faces consequences of production limitation and the need to turn to more climate-friendly energy sources.

A few basics.  Gas produces about 40% of the country’s electricity and heats many of its homes. Once London could rely on the North Sea for its gas; it now imports about half of its gas requirements.  Norway is its primary gas source, but it also depends on gas producers in the U.S., Russia, Qatar, Belgium, and the Netherlands. To add to its woes, the U.K.’s storage capacity would survive only a short period of peak consumption. In 2017, London closed a massive Rough, which accounted for 70% of the country’s entire gas storage system. At the time, London believed it could rely on the global LNG market for reliable and cheap gas. Unfortunately, most LNG tankers head to Asia, a trend that can only increase as power-hungry Asian countries wean themselves from coal and oil.

The exploitation of new energy sources in the U.K. is no less contentious than in the U.S. A good illustration of this would be the tussle over the development of the Cambo oil and gas field in the waters near Scotland. Opposed by environmentalists who cite the inevitable carbon emissions the project and its oil would produce, the project offers to ease London’s energy woes and provide around a thousand jobs. The Johnson government has yet to indicate whether it will approve the project.

London’s options are few and leaving the country reliant on market conditions means risking shortages. For this reason, it has reportedly asked Qatar to agree to become the “supplier of last resort” in case global suppliers are unavailable. 


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The Cipher Brief: What’s the Russian angle to the energy story?

Roule: Upfront, I think we should worry whether Russia will perceive the energy crisis as offering an opportunity for aggression. What if Moscow decides its gas hold over Europe allows it to invade Ukraine without penalty? Or as a means of pushing German regulators to accelerate their approval of the Nordstream II pipeline?

Moscow insists that it is meeting contractual obligations and that its exports have increased in the past year. At the same time, there are routine reports that Russia’s gas supplies to Europe have not only not met requirements, but that gas flow reversed in the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Russia also maintains eight gas storage sites in Europe to help manage supply during high-demand periods. Gas levels at these sites are currently low. Critics claim Gazprom diverted production to Russian domestic storage and that exports in October fell to the lowest level since 2014. When pressed, Moscow explains shortages saying that it must fill its winter supply stocks and expects to send Europe additional gas this week. 

But if the current energy dynamic seems to be in Russia’s interest, Moscow’s long-term prospects are dim. A global shift to renewable energy sources forces Moscow to reckon with the prospect of holding a massive oil infrastructure of little commercial value. If so, future historians may look at the recent Glasgow climate summit as a significant step in accelerating Russia’s decline, possibly a new era of aggression as it seeks to accumulate power ahead of this decline or a more competitive race for market share against OPEC members.

The Cipher Brief: What about China?

Roule: No major country has endured such energy problems in recent months as China. After weeks of rolling blackouts, China looks well on its way to solving its coal problems that partially contributed to this situation. That won’t delight environmentalists, but it should ease China’s electricity problems and ensure its citizens stay warm this winter. Winter arrived early, and Beijing is about to see its first snow of the season. China’s efforts will be put to the test in a winter that many expect to be colder than 2020.

Longer-term, China still must work through the causes of this crisis. If the global economy continues to surge demand for Chinese products, its energy requirements will grow. Weather problems cut wind production; floods shut mines. We shouldn’t be surprised if such problems continue. Inevitably, China can only meet its climate goals by shifting from coal to natural gas, raising prices for other consumers.

The Cipher Brief: Let’s shift to North Africa.  Algeria recently closed a long-established pipeline that transited Morocco to deliver gas to Spain.  Will this impact Europe’s already tight gas situation? What’s the story here? 

Roule: Over the past year, Algerian relations with Morocco have steadily deteriorated.  In addition to their traditional disagreement over the status of Western Sahara and the Polisario, Algiers criticized Morocco’s renewed ties with Israel and accused Rabat of supporting an opposition group that Algeria claims ignited forest fires. Algiers closed its airspace to Moroccan flights and accused Morocco of killing several Algerian citizens in the Sahara region.

Here’s how it touches the energy picture. On 31 October, Algiers closed an 800-mile pipeline that carried Algerian gas to Spain via Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar.  The closure cost Morocco a portion of the gas it used from the pipeline. Morocco used this gas to produce about a tenth of its electricity. Rabat claims it can use other energy sources for this purpose. However, Spain has little gas and derives a significant portion of its electricity from that which it must import. Algiers claims it will make up the loss through a secondary pipeline, but the loss of gas will compound the energy problems of Spain and Europe in general.

The Cipher Brief: Any other issues on the horizon we should consider?

Roule: A growing number of aging refineries in the West will be closed in the coming years.  However, Asia is the new center for refinery construction. This expansion will draw even more crude to the region for processing with the inherent impact on local economies and global consumers.

The Cipher Brief: Last, let’s touch on wild cards. What are the grey swans that might impact markets in 2022?

Roule: With low stockpiles and supplies, the energy topography is ill-prepared to sudden shocks to its production or distribution architecture. Yet, it faces three threats that have grown in the last decade.

First, we have climate change issues.  Increasingly harsh weather events have shut down large portions of the production and refinery sectors in the United States and Mexico, sometimes taking weeks to restore normal production. Second, we have the universe of cyber threats.  State and non-state cyber actors routinely probe or attack every aspect of the energy industry. Last, we have new geopolitical pressures.  Tensions are rising with China as well as Iran and its proxies. Three of the world’s six most significant shipping channels are in the Middle East and a fourth in Asia.

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At least two people were wounded by police gunfire in the Dutch city of Rotterdam after a protest over renewed Covid-19 restrictions spiraled into a violent riot, seeing demonstrators torch a squad car and clash with officers.

A large crowd of protesters showed up at Rotterdam’s iconic Coolsingel street on Friday evening to denounce a new round of pandemic measures, including an ongoing partial lockdown, a ban on New Year’s Eve fireworks displays, as well as fears the government will impose a ‘2G’ pass system allowing only the vaccinated and those who’ve recently recovered from the virus to enter a long list of public places.

At least two people were wounded during the demonstration, a local police spokesperson told Reuters, adding the injuries were “probably” due to officers’ “warning shots” but also noting that “direct shots were fired because the situation was life-threatening” to law enforcement.

Footage of the heated protest circulated online, some clips showing a police squad car fully engulfed in flames after it was apparently torched by rioters.

Demonstrators were also seen launching fireworks at police, who appeared to respond with large quantities of tear gas, which at one point blanketed the area.

Local law enforcement said that officers deployed a mobile riot control unit to Coolsingel and unleashed water cannon on protesters who refused to clear the streets, also noting that some arrests were made after an emergency order was imposed to cordon off the area.

The Dutch government announced the fireworks ban earlier on Friday, saying it is meant to “prevent, as much as possible, extra strain on healthcare, law enforcement and first responders.” However, while private displays are prohibited, officials said that local governments may still put on fireworks shows so long as their Covid-19 restrictions allow it.

The Netherlands currently has a ‘3G’ rule in place, allowing the vaccinated, the recently recovered, as well as those who test negative for the virus to enter most public spaces. But as the country remains under a partial three-week lockdown to rein in growing infections, officials are now mulling the stricter ‘2G’ scheme, prompting the intense demonstrations seen on Friday night.

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Rotterdam Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb has described an anti-lockdown protest in his city as an “orgy of violence.” The Dutch demonstration devolved into a violent riot that saw police open fire on protesters.

Aboutaleb described the events of Friday night as an “orgy of violence,” after protesters packed Rotterdam’s central Coolsingel shopping street to voice their opposition to an ongoing partial lockdown, a ban on New Year’s Eve fireworks displays, and the possibility of a two-tiered system of freedom in the Netherlands, one of liberty for the vaccinated and restrictions for those without the jab.

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A police squad car is seen engulfed in flames during a protest in Rotterdam, Netherlands, November 19, 2021.
2 wounded after shots fired at Covid protest in Netherlands

The protest soon got out of hand, and police said on Saturday that 57 people were arrested. Protesters were seen torching police vehicles and launching fireworks at police, who shot at them in response.

Aboutaleb said that the cops had been “forced” to use their weapons. “On a number of occasions the police felt it necessary to draw their weapons to defend themselves,” he told reporters. “They shot at protesters, people were injured.”

Police say at least seven people were injured. Two of these injuries were caused by police bullets, and the victims are still in hospital. One officer was hospitalized, while several others were treated at the scene for minor injuries.

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President Joe Biden commented on reports that US officials are planning to boycott the upcoming Olympics in Beijing over alleged human rights violations – but his answer left journalists perplexed.

When asked on Tuesday if an official US delegation will be traveling to the Winter Games in the Chinese capital in February, Biden responded: “I am the delegation.”

The president, however, did not elaborate, leaving the White House correspondents in a state of confusion, as his response could mean that Biden will attend the Winter Olympics alone or, as some reporters suggested, that he simply did not understand the question.

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A screen at a restaurant in Beijing showing Chinese President Xi Jinping's virtual meeting with US President Joe Biden. © Reuters / Tingshu Wang
Biden & Xi agree to avoid conflict

A recent report by a Washington Post columnist claimed the US won’t be sending an official delegation to Beijing in 2022 over allegations of human rights violations by the Chinese government. According to the sources cited in the article, a formal recommendation for a diplomatic boycott of the Olympics has been already presented to Biden, with the move expected to be approved by the president by the end of November.

The piece was published on the day that Biden held a lengthy virtual meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, in which they discussed a range of issues regarding the strained relations between the two nations – but not the Olympics.

The White House said that during the talks, President Biden challenged his Chinese counterpart over what Washington sees as persecution against the Uyghur population in the Xinjiang region, as well as human rights violations in Tibet and Hong Kong. China has strongly denied the claims, accusing the US of interfering in its internal affairs.

Calls for the Biden administration to boycott the Olympics and refrain from sending a political delegation to Beijing have recently been made by top Democratic and Republican lawmakers. 

If implemented, it won’t affect the American athletes, who will still be taking part in the Winter Olympics.

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